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I. Introduction
In 1970, Joseph Sax sounded a call for reinvigorating the public trust
doctrine as a means for developing comprehensive legal solutions to natural
resource management challenges.1 Since then, states have applied the
public trust doctrine in many forms, including as a rule of statutory
interpretation, a potential background principle of state property law in
cases alleging takings, and a procedural overlay for administrative decisionmaking processes.2 However, the heart of the public trust doctrine lies in its
original formulation as a restraint on state alienation of public trust lands
under navigable waters, as first articulated by Justice Stephen J. Field in the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.3
The Illinois Central opinion established the original public trust limitation on
state power. A state may not abdicate control over public trust lands,
subject to two narrow exceptions: for purposes promoting the trust, and
conveyances which do not work a substantial impairment of the public
interest.4
Although much has been written about Illinois Central,5 it remains

1.
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970).
2.
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western
Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 578 (1989) (arguing
the public trust operates as a democratizing principle in at least four distinct ways:
(1) as a public easement guaranteeing access, (2) as a restrictive servitude barring
takings claims, (3) as a rule of statutory construction creating presumptions against
trust termination, and (4) as a requirement of reasoned decision-making).
3.
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois (Illinois Central), 146 U.S. 387, 453–55 (1892).
4.
Id. at 453.
5.
A December 2, 2008 Westlaw search reveals the case has been cited in 551
law review articles. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the
American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
799 (2004) (describing the factual history behind the case); Douglas L. Grant,
Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from Illinois Central Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 849, 851 (2001) (arguing the “underpinnings” of the Illinois Central public trust
doctrine are found in the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution and the
reserved powers doctrine); Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411,
422–28 (1987) (explaining that although the Constitutional basis for the Illinois Central
public trust doctrine is not clearly evident from the opinion, the case is best
explained by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because
“[w]hen property is conveyed out of public trust for inadequate consideration, some
114
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unclear whether the origins of the opinion’s public trust doctrine lie in
federal or state law. The answer to this question is essential because if the
Illinois Central public trust doctrine arises from federal law, then the rule
against alienation applies to all states, not just to Illinois.6 In his seminal
article, Charles Wilkinson explored the origins, or the “headwaters” of the
public trust.7 Tracing the history of the public trust doctrine back to Roman
and English common law, Wilkinson observed how the real foundations for
the trust lay in the “high public value in water” recognized by countless
societies.8 He explained that the United States was no exception, as the
nation’s rivers functioned as natural highways for transportation and
commerce since the foundation of the republic.9 Wilkinson persuasively
argued that the Supreme Court’s Illinois Central decision must “have been
premised on federal law” because the most logical explanation is to view the
trust as an implied condition of statehood designed to keep navigable
watercourses free from obstructions to navigation.10 He concluded that the
public trust doctrine operates as a creature of both federal and state law
because it provides broad discretion to the states to control trust lands,
while retaining a federally imposed limit on the ability of states to abdicate
their responsibility as trustees.11
Wilkinson briefly discussed how many state courts have treated the
underlying principles of Illinois Central as law of general applicability, rather
than a creature of Illinois state law.12 Other commentators characterized the
treatment of Illinois Central as highly persuasive, but stopped short of
describing the states’ views of Illinois Central as mandatory or binding.13 Still

citizens receive disproportionate benefits, while others receive disproportionate
losses” in violation of equal protection); see also sources cited infra notes 8, 9, & 13.
6.
Cf. Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in State Law, 15 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 713, 721 (1996) (“Resolving the status of Illinois Central proves significant
because, if the case is understood to be only persuasive, rather than mandatory,
states may contract, eliminate, or halt the expansion of the [public trust] doctrine.”).
7.
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989).
8.
Id. at 429-31, 431.
9.
Id. at 431-38.
10.
Id. at 453, 458.
11.
Id. at 461-62.
12.
See id. at 463 & n.163 (citing state cases).
13.
HARRISON DUNNING, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 30.02(b)(1) & nn.140 & 154
(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991); see also Michael C. Blumm, Harrison C. Dunning, & Scott
W. Reed, Renouncing the Public Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House
Bill, 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 484 & n.130 (1997) (describing how some state courts
have treated Illinois Central as persuasive, but “have accorded the decision enormous
deference as they have shaped their own state law on sovereign rights and the public
trust doctrine”); James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing
and Public Trust Doctrine, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 71-73 & nn.264-70 (1997)
115
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other commentators have recognized the deference accorded to Illinois
Central by state courts, but argue such deference is misplaced.14 This paper
engages in a more in-depth examination of the varying approaches taken by
state courts in an attempt to answer the following question: If Illinois Central
is not a creation of federal law, why do most states characterize it as the
seminal authority in public trust jurisprudence?
Ultimately, this paper challenges the assumption, shared by the
United States Supreme Court,15 that the source of the public trust doctrine is
entirely rooted in state law. Section II explores the philosophical
underpinnings of the Illinois Central public trust doctrine in early United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Section III briefly explains how the
case arrived at the Supreme Court for review and examines the language of
the Illinois Central opinion. In light of the Court’s prior jurisprudence and the
language of the Illinois Central opinion, Section IV reconsiders the competing
explanations for the doctrine’s origins, including the equal footing doctrine,
congressional preemption, the Commerce Clause, and state law, before
concluding that federal common law provides the strongest explanation.
Section V considers several Supreme Court opinions suggesting the public
trust doctrine is a state law doctrine and explains that these statements
were either dicta or were referring to aspects of the public trust doctrine
other than the core federal restraint on alienation. Section VI tests the
hypothesis that the Illinois Central restraint on alienation is a creature of
federal, not state, law by examining state court opinions to have considered
the case. The paper concludes by arguing that the Illinois Central public trust
doctrine is grounded in federal common law.16

(discussing approaches taken by state courts in examining, expanding, and
conflating the Illinois Central doctrine).
14.
See Blumm, Dunning, & Reed, supra note 13, at 484 (noting some “state
courts have treated Illinois Central as persuasive rather than binding authority”);
Pearson, supra note 6, at 719 (citing the differing treatment given to Illinois Central by
state courts); see also id. at 740-41 (concluding the decision was inherently flawed,
implicitly overruled, or limited by later decisions, and that consequently “states that
have viewed Illinois Central as mandating or controlling the content of the public trust
doctrine should revisit the question”).
15.
See, e.g., Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (“the
conclusion reached was necessarily a statement of Illinois law”); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (“[I]t has been long established that the
individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public
trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”)
16.
This paper does not address the issue of whether there is a federal public
trust, in the sense of a public trusteeship guiding federal management of federal
public lands (such as the national forests, national parks, and so forth). For a
consideration of that issue by courts, see, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537
(1911) (“All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the
whole country. And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be
administered. That is for Congress to determine.”) (internal quotations omitted);
116
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A persuasive explanation of the Illinois Central rule must meet three
criteria. It must: 1) be consistent with the language and reasoning of the
Illinois Central court; 2) explain, or at least not contradict, the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the case in later decisions; and 3) explain why state
courts have injected continuing vitality to the decision. The federal common
law theory meets each of these three criteria. Ultimately, understanding the
federal core of the public trust doctrine provides much needed balance to
public trust jurisprudence, as it does not impose unreasonable restrictions
on state interpretations of the doctrine, yet precludes states from
renouncing the public trust.

II. Background: Nineteenth Century Jurisprudential
Underpinnings of Illinois Central
Although Illinois Central is sometimes interpreted as the sole case
establishing the public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence, earlier
Supreme Court decisions had laid much of the groundwork for the Illinois
Central public trust doctrine. Justice Field actually based his analysis in
Illinois Central on two points of “settled law.”17 First, sovereignty over
submerged lands below navigable waters was held by the state in trust for
the public.18 Second, states had the power to convey or lease those
submerged lands, provided the conveyance did not impair the public
interest, and subject to the paramount right of Congress to control
navigation.19 As authority for these two premises, Justice Field cited four
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (“[A] general trust
duty [is] imposed upon the National Park Service, Department of the Interior, by the
National Park System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., to conserve scenery and natural and
historic objects and wildlife (in the National Parks, Monuments and reservations)
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”). But see Sierra
Club v. Dep’t of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that the
Secretary of Interior satisfied the trust obligation by taking “good faith steps” to fulfill
his duties, and that ultimate authority to authorize funds necessary to carry out the
trust responsibilities lies with Congress).
For a discussion of the federal
government’s trust responsibilities on federal public lands, see Charles F. Wilkinson,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Lands Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 273-74, 278 (1980)
(arguing that federal lands are impressed with a public trust responsibility, but
recognizing that the source of this responsibility is distinct from the source of the
Illinois Central public trust impressed upon the states in submerged lands).
17.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 435 (1892)
18.
Id. at 457-58 (explaining that sovereignty over submerged lands are “held
by the people of the state in their character as sovereign in trust for public uses for
which they are adapted”).
19.
Id. at 435 (“It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the
several states, belong to the respective states within which they are found, with the
consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done
117
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earlier Supreme Court cases.20 This section examines those four cases to
ascertain whether they provide support for the two points of “settled law”
that underlie the Illinois Central opinion. Examining the jurisprudential
origins of the American public trust doctrine provides a useful backdrop for
understanding why the Illinois Central rule derives from federal law.21

A. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee: The Supreme Court Ratifies
the Public Trust Doctrine
In 1842, in Martin v. Waddell, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
competing claims by riparian landowners to harvest oysters from submerged
mudflats below New Jersey’s Raritan River and Bay. After the riparian
landowner, Merrit Martin, interfered with William Waddell’s lessee’s harvest
of oysters from submerged lands, Waddell’s lessee filed an ejectment action
against Martin in the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey in 1835.22
Both parties claimed exclusive rights to harvest oysters based on riparian
land ownership.23 After the jury traced the chain of possessory title to the
lands,24 it ruled in favor of Waddell’s lessee, and Martin appealed to the
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and
subject always to the paramount right of congress to control their navigation so far
as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among
the states. This doctrine has been often announced by this court, and is not
questioned by counsel of any of the parties.”).
20.
Id. at 435, 457-58. Justice Field cited to Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367
(1842), Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845), Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners, 85
U.S. 57 (1873), and McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876). Each of these cases is
discussed below in full.
21.
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 826 (“Without some understanding
of the shifting sands of nineteenth-century law regarding ownership of submerged
lands, one cannot comprehend . . . the legal theories advanced in the Illinois Central
litigation.”).
22.
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. at 369.
23.
Id. at 407-08. Martin claimed possessory right under a lease issued by an
1824 New Jersey state law which declared the submerged lands under the Raritan Bay
and River should be set aside for planting and harvesting oysters. Id. at 379, 407-08.
Waddell’s lessee claimed possessory right by terms of a pre-statehood grant from
one of the original twenty-four proprietors charged with settlement of New Jersey. Id.
at 407-08. An 1834 state survey recognized Waddell’s lessee’s claim. Id.
24.
The jury found that in 1664, King Charles II granted to his brother James,
the Duke of York, letters-patent to the lands that later became New Jersey. Id. at 36974 (quoting text of letters-patent in full). The Duke of York granted those lands to
persons who then conveyed their interest in the lands to twenty-four proprietors. Id.
at 375-77. The Duke of York executed a 1682 grant conveying his interests in the
lands to these twenty-four proprietors for settlement purposes, and King Charles II
subsequently recognized the rights of these proprietors to possess, settle, and
dispose of the “province of East Jersey” in 1683. Id. at 377-78. In 1702, the
proprietors surrendered all their governmental powers to Queen Anne, retaining
their private property rights in their lands. Id. at 378, 407.
118

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010

United States Supreme Court.25
The Supreme Court reversed.26 Chief Justice Taney for the Court
concluded that Waddell’s lessee could not show possessory title to the
submerged lands because his pre-statehood grant conveyed only private,
not public rights,27 and the public right of fishery in navigable waters vested
in the people of the state of New Jersey after the American Revolution.28
Neither a 1664 grant from King Charles II to the Duke of York, nor a 1682
grant from the Duke of York to New Jersey’s original twenty-four proprietors29
vested the recipient with the power to dispose of public rights (also called
regalia or prerogative rights) in the submerged lands to private ownership.30
Justice Taney explained that such a power would have impermissibly
interfered with the public trust in which the Crown held the lands by
excluding settlers from accessing, fishing, harvesting oysters from, or
bathing in New Jersey waters.31 According to Martin, the public rights in
submerged lands beneath navigable waters like Raritan River and Bay
(including the public right of fishery) passed from the British Crown directly
to the people of the colonies as a consequence of the American
Revolution.32 Acting as trustee for the people of the New Jersey, the state

25.
Id. at 369. The case seems to have been appealed directly from the circuit
court, acting as a trial court. Id.
26.
Id. at 418.
27.
Id. at 410, 415.
28.
Id. at 410.
29.
See discussion supra note 30.
30.
The Court held the 1664 grant from King Charles II to the Duke of York
included a grant of public rights because the grant was from one sovereign to
another sovereign and because the purpose of the 1664 grant was for the Duke to
establish and govern the colony of New Jersey under the authority of the King.
Martin, 41 U.S. at 412. The language of the 1664 grant conveyed public rights in the
submerged lands, but it did not explicitly vest the Duke of York with authority to
dispose of those public rights to private ownership. Id. at 414. Nor did the 1664 grant
implicitly authorize disposal of public rights to private hands, because such an
interpretation could have destroyed the public right of fishery. Id. at 411-13.
Similarly, the 1682 grant to the twenty-four proprietors did not vest the proprietors
with the authority to convey submerged lands into private ownership; such authority
would have directly conflicted with the 1682 grant’s primary purpose of settling New
Jersey because private landowners could then have impeded settlement by limiting
public access to New Jersey waters. Id. at 414.
31.
Id. at 414.
32.
Id. at 416. Any prerogative rights held by the Duke returned undiminished
to the Crown in 1702 when the twenty-four proprietors abandoned their governance
claims to Queen Anne. Id. Justice Taney explained that as a result of the American
Revolution, “the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under
them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
Constitution to the general government.” Id. at 410.
119
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passed laws that preserved the oyster fishery for public benefit,33 including
the law authorizing Martin’s lease of the oyster beds.34 Thus, the Court
upheld Martin’s exclusive right to harvest oysters under his lease.35
Martin established two important principles of public trust law. First,
Justice Taney ratified the doctrine, articulated twenty years earlier by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Arnold v. Mundy,36 that the English Crown held
the beds of navigable rivers in trust for public ownership at common law.37
Second, Martin clarified that sovereignty of the public rights in trust lands,
including the public right of fishery, transferred to the people of the several
states following the American Revolution.38 Martin, however, did not resolve
the nature of the state’s title to the lands,39 nor the ability of the state to
permanently convey trust lands.40 The Martin Court never reached the issue
of whether a state could convey title to submerged lands41 because the facts
involved a state lease of exclusive fishing rights on a small parcel of land,
not a grant of fee simple title.42 Consequently, although Martin resolved
several important issues of public trust law, it left other questions
unanswered.

33.
Id. at 416, 417.
34.
See id. at 408, 418.
35.
Id. at 418.
36.
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821).
37.
Id. at 53.
38.
Martin, 41 U.S. at 416.
39.
See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 6, at 731 (“Martin is silent on the issue of
whether a public trust obligation restricting a state’s power of alienation encumbers
the state’s title to submerged stream beds of navigable waterways.”); Rasband, supra
note 13, at 29 (explaining that Justice “Taney cannot be credited with, or criticized for,
the invention of the public trust doctrine” because he only applied the reasoning of
New Jersey Chief Justice Kirkpatrick from Arnold and did not develop the doctrine the
way that Justice Field did in Illinois Central).
40.
But see Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. at 78 (“The sovereign power itself,
therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the
constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters
of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance
which never could be long borne by a free people.”).
41.
Martin, 41 U.S. at 410 (explaining that the facts in the case did not raise
the question of the power of the King of England to grant private rights in submerged
lands); see also id. at 388 (explaining the argument for Waddell’s lessee that the
Supreme Court need not answer “whether the King of England can grant the soil of
the sea and its arms, so as to destroy or prejudice public rights.”).
42.
Id. at 407.
120

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010

B. Pollard v. Hagan: The Supreme Court Articulates the
Equal Footing Doctrine
The next significant Supreme Court public trust case was Pollard v.
Hagan, which involved competing claims to submerged lands beneath the
Mobile River. John Pollard, who claimed title to the submerged lands from
an 1836 federal patent issued after Alabama became a state,43 brought an
ejectment action against John Hagan in Alabama state trial court.44 Hagan
claimed title to the lands from an 1802 Spanish grant that had been
confirmed by the Alabama state legislature in 1824.45 The trial court found
for Hagan, and Pollard appealed to the state supreme court, arguing the trial
court had erroneously instructed the jury to find for Hagan if the disputed
lands were below the ordinary high water mark at the time of Alabama’s
admission to the Union.46 The state supreme court affirmed the trial court’s
jury instruction, and Pollard appealed.47
In an 1845 opinion authored by Justice McKinley, a majority of the
United States Supreme Court affirmed.48 The Court concluded that Pollard’s
1836 federal patent was invalid because the federal government issued it
after Alabama’s admission to the Union, at a time when the United States
retained no authority to dispose of the territory of the states, except for
disposal of federal public lands.49 To reach this conclusion, the Court
articulated what has become known as the equal footing doctrine,50 which
contemplated political sovereignty for each newly admitted state equal in

43.
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 219 (1845); see Mark A. Graber, Naked Land
Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73, 102 (2000) (“Most
Jacksonian leaders . . . agreed that when territories became states, the federal
government retained title (though not jurisdiction) over unappropriated and waste
lands. Consistent with this belief, the national government continued selling and
giving away . . . lands after a territory became a state.”).
44.
Pollard, 44 U.S. at 213.
45.
Id. at 214-15 (argument for Hagan); see also Graber, supra note 43, at 102
(“Hagan claimed title by virtue of a grant from Alabama to the shore lands.”).
46.
Id. at 213, 214.
47.
Id. at 213.
48.
Id. at 230. Justice Catron dissented, arguing the lands at issue were waste
and unappropriated lands that had been disclaimed by Alabama, and were subject to
disposal by the United States. Id. at 234-35 (Catron, J., dissenting).
49.
Id. at 223 (“When Alabama was admitted into the union . . . she succeeded
to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia
possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by
the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United
States . . . . Nothing remained in the United States according to the terms of the
agreement, but the public lands.”).
50.
See Rasband, supra note 13, at 30.
121
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kind to the political sovereignty held by the original thirteen colonies.51 The
Court explained that the United States never held sovereignty over the lands
of the new states, but rather, held the lands in trust until the creation of
those new states.52 Thus, when Alabama entered the Union under the 1819
Admissions Act, Alabama, as Georgia’s successor, inherited sovereign rights
in submerged lands beneath navigable waters.53 Congress lacked the power
to issue patents to submerged lands after Alabama’s admission because
such a power would conflict with Alabama’s sovereignty.54 Thus, the Court
held Pollard’s claim of title from the federal grant invalid.55
Pollard v. Hagan filled the gap left open by Martin regarding the status of
submerged lands beneath navigable waters. Pollard explained the legal
process for the transfer of sovereignty from the crown to states other than
the original thirteen colonies. By articulating the equal footing doctrine as
the mechanism by which new states gained sovereignty over submerged
lands,56 the Pollard Court confirmed that state trusteeship over submerged
lands for the public was an essential component of the political sovereignty
of states.57

51.
Pollard, 44 U.S. at 222; see Rasband, supra note 13, at 32-34. The language
of “equal footing” first appeared in the Ordinance of 1784, explaining that any
territories to become states would enter as political equals to the original thirteen
states. Id. at 32-33. The Continental Congress amended the Ordinance in 1787 to
adopt “a more restrictive approach to territorial government.” Id. Section 13 of the
introduction of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance stated that one of its purposes was to
provide “for the establishment of States, and permanent government therein, and for
their admission to a share in the Federal councils on an equal footing with the
original States.” Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Introduction, § 13. Article 5 of the
1787 Northwest Ordinance declared that when a territory reached 60,000 free
inhabitants, “such State shall be admitted . . . into the Congress of the United States,
on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever[.]” Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, Art. 5. (emphasis added). After ratification of the United States
Constitution, the first Congress of the United States adopted the language of the
1787 Ordinance in 1789. See Rasband, supra note 13, at 33-34 & 33 n.130.
52.
Pollard, 44 U.S. at 221. Thus, the United States temporarily held the lands
ceded by Georgia in trust for the future states to be formed from those lands. Id. at
221, 222. This trust terminated on Alabama’s admission to the union. Id. at 223. The
only limit on Alabama’s sovereignty was a temporary loss of control over federal
public lands until the United State disposed of those lands to pay the Revolutionary
War debt. Id. at 224.
53.
Id. at 229.
54.
Id. at 230.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 223, 230.
57.
Id. at 229.
122
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C. Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners: The Public Trust
Limits the Right to Wharf Out
In 1851, the California state legislature passed a statute leasing
submerged lands beneath San Francisco harbor to the city of San Francisco
for maintenance of a permanent waterfront.58 Also in 1851, the state
legislature enacted legislation authorizing the city to construct wharves for
public use at the end of all streets that met the San Francisco Bay.59 After
the passage of these statutes, Weber acquired title to lands along the
waterfront and, in 1854, constructed a private wharf.60 In 1863, after the state
legislature passed a statute granting the Board of Harbor Commissioners
(Board) authority to take possession of private wharves and make harbor
improvements,61 Weber sued the Board in the Circuit Court for the District of
California to restrain the Board from constructing wharves, landings, and
other harbor improvements that would destroy his wharf.62 The trial court
dismissed Weber’s suit, and Weber appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.63
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court in 1873.64 The Court held
that Weber took title to the lands subordinate to the Board’s authority over
the San Francisco harbor, as delegated by the state.65 Consequently, the

58.
Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 85 U.S. 57, 66 (1873). The 1851 Act required
the city to keep the space beyond 500 yards of shore free of all obstructions,
reserving the right of the state to regulate wharves and other improvements. Id.
59.
Id. at 66-67. This act required “that the space between the wharves, when
extended, should remain free from obstructions and be used as public slips for the
accommodation and benefit of the general commerce of the city and State.” Id. at 67.
Thus, the two 1851 acts furthered, not undermined, the public trust by facilitating
commerce and public use of the harbor.
60.
Id. at 67.
61.
See id. at 69, 71 (“[T]he act creating the harbor commissioners and
authorizing them to take possession and improve the water front, was a public act
relating to a matter of public concern.”). Because the 1863 Act granted possession of
the harbor to the Board for purposes of advancing public trust purposes, the 1863
Act in Weber is distinguishable from the 1852 grant in Illinois Central from the city to
the railroad. Additionally, in Weber, the state did not intend to alienate its control
over the ability to protect public uses of the lands by the 1863 delegation of authority
from the State to the city and the Board of Harbor Commissioners, in contrast to the
Illinois Central facts where the Supreme Court viewed the legislature’s grant to the
railroad as conveying essential attributes of sovereign ownership to a private
company. See id.; Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
62.
Weber, 85 U.S. at 67, 69.
63.
Id. at 63.Weber appeared to have appealed the case directly from the
circuit court. Id. at 59.
64.
Id. at 71.
65.
Id. at 67. Further, a statute of limitations cited by Weber did not bar the
state’s claim of ownership over the submerged lands because the statute only
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Board had the authority to protect the public trust by limiting Weber’s right
to wharf out.66 On behalf of the Court, Justice Field reiterated the
proposition from Pollard that when California entered the Union, dominion
over submerged lands passed to the state as trustee for the public under the
equal footing doctrine.67 The Weber opinion reaffirmed that the state held
the submerged lands beneath the harbor in trust for the public,68 and
therefore could limit the ability of a riparian proprietor to wharf out.69

D. McCready v. Virginia: The Public Trust As a Power to
Regulate Common Property for the Public Good
In the mid-1870s, McCready, a Maryland citizen, planted oysters in the
beds of Virginia’s Ware River, in violation of a Virginia statute prohibiting
non-Virginia citizens from planting oysters in Virginia riverbeds.70 The state
of Virginia convicted him and fined him $500.71 The Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and McCready appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, alleging the conviction violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Constitution.72
In 1876, the Supreme Court upheld the Virginia law and affirmed
McCready’s conviction.73 Chief Justice Waite framed the issue as whether
Virginia could prohibit the citizens of other states from planting oysters in
its submerged lands in order to protect that privilege for its own citizens.74
The Court recognized that the states owned the beds of tidewaters within
their jurisdiction as representative of the public’s sovereign authority75
because submerged lands are the “common property” of the public.76 But
the Court concluded that Virginia’s law did not violate the Constitution’s

applied to lands held by the state “as private proprietor” and not to lands held by the
state “as sovereign in trust for the public.” Id. at 68. Alternatively, the 1863 Act
authorizing the Harbor Commissioners to take control of improvements on the
harbor was an effective assertion of ownership barring any implication that the state
intended to abandon its rights in the submerged lands. Id. at 69.
66.
Id. at 67.
67.
Id. at 65-66, 69.
68.
Id. at 69 (explaining the city held the water front “as sovereign in trust for
the public”).
69.
Id. at 67.
70.
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 391 (1876).
71.
Id. The opinion does not make clear whether the Ware River was
navigable, however it was subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. Id. at 394.
72.
Id. at 391, 393.
73.
Id. at 397.
74.
Id. at 395.
75.
Id. at 394-95.
76.
Id. at 395.
124

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010

Privileges and Immunities Clause77 because the right to use the submerged
lands was a property right, “not a mere privilege or immunity.”78
Consequently, McCready’s claim failed because the Privileges and
Immunities Clause did not require that citizens of one state have access to
“the common property of the citizens of another State.”79 McCready thus
affirmed that, due to the public trust, each state may manage submerged
lands for the public’s benefit because ownership of the lands lies in the
public, not the state.80
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Martin, Pollard, Weber, and McCready
support the two points that the Illinois Central Court characterized as settled
law. Pollard and Weber detailed how the concept of equal footing gives a
state sovereignty over submerged lands and may abdicate control of
submerged lands in ways that do not offend the public interest. Martin,
Pollard, and McCready made clear that states exercise their sovereignty over
the submerged lands in their capacity as trustee for the public. As these
cases arose in four different states (New Jersey, Alabama, California, and
Virginia), the Supreme Court’s use of these two generally applicable
principles of public trust law in each case suggests these principles are
rooted in federal, not state, law. These four cases outlined the legal context
for the Illinois Central decision, which raised the question of whether a state
may terminate the public trust in submerged lands by granting control of
those lands to a private party.81

III. The Facts and Law of Illinois Central
This section considers the factual background of the Illinois Central case
as well as the language and rationale of the Illinois Central opinion. Although
77.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The Court also held Virginia's law did not violate
the commerce clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8), because the “cultivation and
production” of oysters did not constitute commerce. McCready, 94 U.S. at 396.
78.
Id. at 395.
79.
Id. at 395-96. Further, the Court emphasized the property right in
harvesting oysters stemmed from the sovereignty of the people of the state. Id. at
396 (“[T]he right thus granted is not a privilege or immunity of general but of special
citizenship. It does not belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, but
only to the citizens of Virginia . . . They owned it, not by virtue of citizenship merely,
but of citizenship and domicile united . . . .”) (quotations omitted).
80.
See id.
81.
See also Florida v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 647 (Fla. 1893)
(explaining that to the extent the language in McCready and Weber differs from the
articulation of the public trust in Illinois Central, the differences can be explained
because no facts in McCready nor Weber “called for or justified a precise definition of
the nature of the tenure of trusts upon which lands below low-water mark are held,
or of the powers of the legislature, as the representative of the people, to dispose of
them . . . . The issues in the Illinois [Central] case were, however, altogether different,
and required the full adjudication and exposition there made[.]”).
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Justice Field’s majority opinion did not explicitly resolve the origins of the
public trust doctrine, his reasoning strongly suggested the public trust
doctrine grounded in federal, not state, law.

A. The Factual History Behind the Case: How Illinois
Central Arrived Before the Supreme Court
By the mid-nineteenth century, the city of Chicago had long been
concerned with building a better Chicago harbor.82 Swirling Lake Michigan
currents created sandbars, impeding navigation in the harbor, and caused
erosion that placed the homes of wealthy lakefront residents at risk.83 In the
1840s, the city engaged in three failed attempts to build breakwaters to limit
erosion and improve navigation.84 Then, in 1851, the Illinois Central
Railroad made the city an offer it couldn’t refuse: In exchange for the city
allowing the railroad to locate its rail line right-of-way (granted by the state)
along the lakefront, the railroad would finance and construct a breakwater.85
Accepting the railroad’s offer, the city of Chicago enacted several
ordinances that allowed the railroad to site its rail line along the Chicago
lakefront.86 Nearly two decades later,87 after much political maneuvering,88
the state legislature passed the Lake Front Act of 1869,89 which granted the
railroad “appropriation, occupancy, use and control” of a substantial portion
of the harbor.90 But, by 1873 the public’s view of the railroad soured,91 and

82.
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 810-23 (detailing the City’s efforts
and challenges). Kearney & Merrill’s article contains an in-depth analysis of the
factual history of Illinois Central, which proved extremely instructive and helpful to the
development of the much briefer factual summary contained within this paper.
83.
Id. at 811-12, 817-18.
84.
Id. at 817 (“The solution to the erosion problem south of the river was
widely perceived to be the construction of a breakwater offshore in the lake. Three
attempts to build such a structure were undertaken in the 1840s. The first two
proved inadequate to withstand the force of the lake. The third foundered in a
dispute over funding.”) (citation omitted).
85.
Id. at 819.
86.
Id. at 820, 822-23.
87.
Id. at 823. Development of the rail line paused in the late 1850s because
of the Civil War and an economic downturn. Id.
88.
See id. at 839-77 for a detailed discussion of the political schemes and
positioning behind the ultimate passage of the law, including a discussion of the
initial 1867 proposal that Kearney & Merrill describe as a “classic rent-seeking
scheme,” excerpts from contemporaneous Illinois newspaper articles and editorials,
the role of state lobbyist-turned-legislator Alonzo W. Mack, and the final vote by the
legislature to override the Illinois governor’s veto of the 1869 Act.
89.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 448.
90.
Id. (quoting section 3 of the Act). The Act further provided that “nothing
herein contained shall authorize obstructions to the Chicago harbor, or impair the
public right of navigation.” Id. at 449. Professors Kearney & Merrill describe how
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the legislature repealed the rights it previously granted to the railroad.92 The
state attorney general proceeded to sue the railroad in state court, seeking a
determination that it had the sole and exclusive title to the Chicago harbor
lands both reclaimed from and submerged under Lake Michigan.93 Alleging
presence of federal questions, the railroad removed the case to federal
circuit court.94
In an opinion written by Supreme Court Justice Harlan sitting as a
circuit court judge, the Circuit Court upheld the validity of the 1873
repealing act, and thus ruled the state held title to the submerged lands.95
Framing the case as a contract dispute, Justice Harlan held the
Constitution’s contract clause rule prohibiting legislative repeal of vested
rights guaranteed by a contract did not control because the rule applied only
to good-faith purchasers for value, a category which did not include the
railroad.96 Consequently, Justice Harlan viewed the 1873 Act as permissibly
revoking a license granted to the railroad by the 1869 Act passed to improve

“[t]he practical effect of the Lake Front Act, in terms of the market for harbor facilities
in Chicago, was to authorize the creation of a large, privately owned harbor facility in
the lake that would act as a supplement to the harbor facilities that already
existed[.]” See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 881.
91.
Id. at 905–06 (discussing how the early 1870s witnessed the rise of the
Granger Movement, “a form of rural populism that made railroads a particular focus
for political agitation” that centered in Illinois, and how legislative “deliberations
were negative and recriminatory in nature” with a focus on “whether to punish the
[railroad] and its supporters for their assumed venality in 1869 by repealing the Lake
Front”).
92.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 449 (“On the 15th of April, 1873, the legislature
of Illinois repealed the act.”); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 905-12 (explaining
the murky history behind the 1873 repealing act).
93.
Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. 730, 750 (N.D. Ill. 1888).
94.
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 916. The railroad raised defenses of
constitutionally protected vested-rights, interpretations of the federal Northwest
Ordinance, and inconsistencies with the Illinois Statehood Act. Id. at 916 n.529. In
1883, Justice Harlan denied the state’s motion to remand to the state court because
he believed federal issues existed regarding whether the 1869 Act repealing the grant
violated the contracts clause or the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Illinois v. Illinois Central R. Co., 16 F. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1883). Consequently,
the removal of the case to federal court sheds no light as to whether the Supreme
Court opinion turned on state law or federal law because at the time the presence of
federal arguments in an answer satisfied federal question jurisdiction. See Kearney &
Merrill, supra note 5, at 916.
95.
Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. 730, 775-76 (N.D. Ill. 1888). The Circuit
Court also ruled the city held title to the non-submerged lands comprising Lake
Front Park. Id. at 776.
96.
Id. at 774-75. (limiting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), “to the
facts and issues in the particular case in which it was used” and holding “[t]he
present case is not controlled by Fletcher v. Peck. The railroad company was not a
purchaser of the submerged lands. It paid nothing for them.”).
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the Chicago harbor.97 The railroad appealed to the Supreme Court.98
The task of writing the Illinois Central opinion fell to Justice Stephen J.
Field, who had previously authored opinions that addressed the
adjudications of title and rights to submerged lands.99 Justice Field wrote
the 1870 Daniel Ball opinion, which adopted the navigability-in-fact test as
determinative of whether waters are subject to federal Commerce Clause
jurisdiction,100 as well as the Weber opinion, where the Court used the public
trust doctrine to limit a private landowner’s right to wharf out in submerged
lands.101 He also wrote the 1891 opinion of Packer v. Bird,102 in which the
Supreme Court held a landowner’s post-statehood federal patent granting
the landowner the east and west bank of a navigable stream did not include
title to an island in the middle of the stream because the language of the
patent did not clearly evidence an intent to convey the submerged lands.103
In Packer, Justice Field observed that submerged land104 “properly belongs to
the states by their inherent sovereignty.”105 Threads of these prior decisions

97.
Id. at 775 (“In short, [the railroad] accepted the grant of the submerged
lands with the knowledge that the only purpose of the state was to improve the
harbor of Chicago . . . . The repeal of the act making the grant was therefore nothing
more than a change of policy upon the part of the state, which . . . . in effect, only
revoked the license which had been granted to the [railroad] company to improve the
harbor of Chicago.”).
98.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 433.
99.
For general discussion of Justice Field’s career, see generally sources
cited in Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 451 nn.106-11, including references to works by
Justice Field’s biographer, Charles W. McCurdy.
100.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (subjecting waters to federal commerce
clause jurisdiction only when they qualified as navigable-in-fact because they were
“used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water”). The United States had filed a suit for libel after
the steamboat vessel Daniel Ball used the Grand River within the State of Michigan
without inspection or license from the United States, as required by federal statutes.
Id. at 558-59. Concluding the Grand River was navigable under the enunciated
navigable-in-fact test, the United Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit
court that reversed the district court’s dismissal of the libel suit. Id. at 559, 565, 566.
101.
See discussion supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
102.
137 U.S. 661 (1891).
103.
Id. at 662, 663, 669, 673. A riparian landowner, claiming ownership of the
land by virtue of a post-statehood federal patent, sued a trespasser to regain
possession after the trespasser began using an eighty-acre island in the middle of
the Sacramento River. Id. at 662. Finding the federal patent conveyed no ownership
rights in the island, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower and state
supreme court judgments for defendant. Id. at 662.
104.
State law defines submerged lands as lands beneath either the high water
mark or low water mark. Id. at 669.
105.
Because the Supreme Court held the federal patent to the landowner did
not demonstrate intent to convey the lands below the limits of high water, the court
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likely shaped Justice Field’s consideration of the facts in Illinois Central.106

B. Examining the Source: The Language and Rationale of
Illinois Central
A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed Justice Harlan’s opinion,107
which found that the state retained title to the submerged lands, but on
different grounds.108 The Court ultimately invalidated the legislature’s 1869
did not reach the question of whether the United States could have conveyed the
lands. Id. at 672 (“[T]he United States has wisely abstained from extending, if it could
extend, its survey and grants beyond the limits of high water.”) (emphasis added).
Justice Field had previous experience with judicial management of conflicting
claims to natural resources in his tenure as Chief Justice on the California Supreme
Court, when the state court clarified California water appropriation and mining
law. See generally Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development
in California, 1850-1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth-Century
America, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 235, 240-46 (1975). One possible reason for Justice
Field’s decision to resolve the dispute in Illinois Central by enunciating a broad
general principle restraining alienation of trust lands is that his prior experience
on the California Supreme Court had demonstrated the difficulty of judicial
resource management on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 262 (explaining how “[t]he
delicate structure of water rights erected by the California court managed to
survive until it encountered passive new pressures that made it impossible to
reconcile the conflicting interests of resource-users on a case-by-case basis”
requiring articulation of more general principles).
106.
See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 924 (concluding, after an indepth historical examination of the underlying facts of Illinois Central, that “Justice
Field did not think that submerged land should remain frozen in its original
condition. He was all in favor of isolated grants of lands for wharves and docks.
What he opposed was what he imagined to be the conferral of a monopoly over the
Chicago harbor on a private corporation.”).
107.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 464 (1892). The United States Supreme Court
directed the lower court to investigate whether any of the piers or docks installed by
the railroad could remain in the river as incident to the railroad’s riparian ownership
rights, i.e., because they were not in navigable waters. Id. at 463, 464.
108.
The participating justices split four to three, with Justice Harlan joining
the majority. Chief Justice Fuller recused himself, as he had served as counsel for the
City of Chicago on the lower court case. Id. at 464; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra
note 5, at 839 n.176. Similarly, Justice Blatchford did not participate because he
owned stock in the railroad. Id. at 918; see also Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 464.
Justice Shiras authored the dissent for himself, Justice Gray, and Justice Brown. 146
U.S. at 476. The dissenters agreed that the public had rights in the lands below navigable
waters, but viewed the state’s public trust challenge as essentially unripe. See id. at 474
(Shiras, J., dissenting). The dissenters agreed the state could not part with its sovereign
powers over the submerged lands, but read the 1869 act as expressly and impliedly
limiting the railroad’s title and control over the lands, concluding that there “will be time
enough to invoke the doctrine of the inviolability of public rights when and if the railroad
company shall attempt to disregard them.” Id. at 473-74. The dissenters would have
upheld the 1869 grant and invalidated the Illinois legislature’s 1873 repeal of the grant as
an unlawful impairment of contract. Id. at 473, 475.
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conveyance to the railroad for violating the state’s responsibilities as trustee
for the public benefit and therefore upheld the 1873 legislative act repealing
the 1869 act as valid and effective.109 The Court’s language and analysis
clearly relied on federal common law as the foundation of the public trust
doctrine.
The parties framed the issue as whether the state or the railroad held
title to the submerged lands of Chicago harbor,110 but answering that
question turned on the Court’s resolution of the obligations and authorities
characterizing a state’s title in submerged lands.111 Determining which party
held title depended upon the validity of the 1869 Lake Front Act conveying
submerged lands to the railroad.112 The validity of the 1869 act, in turn,
depended on the answer to the following question posited by Justice Field:
“[W]hether the legislature was competent to thus deprive the State of its
ownership of the submerged lands in the harbor of Chicago, and of the
consequent control of its waters.”113 By framing the issue as one of
legislative power to convey the lands, rather than of legislative intent,114

109.
Illinois Central,146 U.S. at 459, 460.
110.
Id. at 433.
111.
Id. at 452. Grant has argued that the public trust doctrine articulated in
Illinois Central actually fits within the broader reserved powers doctrine. Grant, supra
note 5, at 851. This doctrine emphasizes that, because the legislative power is vested
in the legislative branch, and only temporarily held within any given legislature, that
legislature cannot impair the legislative powers of a later legislature. Id. at 872.
112.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 450 (“As to the grant of submerged lands, the act
declares that all the right and title of the state in and to the submerged lands,
constituting the bed of Lake Michigan . . . ‘are granted in fee to the railroad company,
its successors and assigns’ . . . This clause is treated by the counsel of the company as an
absolute conveyance to it of title to the submerged lands, giving it as full and complete power
to use and dispose of the same, except in the technical transfer of the fee, in any
manner it may choose, as if they were uplands, in no respect covered or affected by
navigable waters, and not as a license to use the lands subject to revocation by the
state. Treating it as such a conveyance, its validity must be determined by the
consideration whether the legislature was competent to make a grant of the kind.”)
(emphasis added). Professor Pearson argued that this line of analysis should be
considered to be dicta because the court improperly interpreted the conveyance, see
Pearson, supra note 6, at 736. However, the Court’s characterization of the
conveyance as a fee simple grant is not dicta, but instead a part of the Court’s
holding because that characterization served as an essential basis of the Court’s
decision.
113.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452. The characterization of the grant as a
permanent conveyance represents a significant departure from the Circuit Court’s
treatment of the grant as a revocable license. Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. 730,
775 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888) (opinion of Justice Harlan).
114.
See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452 (“The question, therefore, to be
considered is whether the legislature was competent to thus deprive the state of its
ownership of the submerged lands . . . .”) (emphasis added); See Rasband, supra note
13, at 63 (“Had the Supreme Court applied the prima facie rule of the common law, its
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Justice Field analyzed in what manner the state holds title to lands under
navigable waters.115
As backdrop for its analysis, the Illinois Central Court relied heavily on
the equal footing doctrine and its relationship to state sovereignty. The
Court held that when Illinois entered the Union, it was “on an equal footing
with the original states, in all respects.”116 Justice Field explained that under
the concept of equal footing, “[t]here can be no distinction between the
several states of the Union in the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty,
and dominion which they may possess and exercise.”117 Turning to the
character of “dominion”118 possessed by the states in the submerged lands,
Justice Field explained that the states held the same type of “dominion and
sovereignty” as the English Crown exercised, meaning the submerged lands
held by the states were “subject to the same trusts and limitations” as those
held by the English Crown.119
The Illinois Central Court determined that each state, by virtue of its
sovereign power, held submerged lands of navigable waters in the same
nature as the English Crown’s common law title to tidelands.120 As a generic
rule, all states own these lands in trust for the public, subject to the public
purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing.121 As a result, a state may
not “sanction the abdication of the general control” over such lands.122
Field’s comparison of a state’s attempt to relinquish its public trust

analysis would have been short. The legislation left no ambiguity concerning the
1869 legislature’s intent to convey the submerged lands to the Railroad. Rather than
analyzing the legislature’s intent, however, the Court . . . analyzed the legislature’s
power to convey.”).
115.
See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
116.
Id. at 434.
117.
Id. at 434.
118.
As it related to submerged lands, Justice Field viewed “dominion” as the
power of the state to guarantee unimpaired public access and use of the trust lands.
Id. at 436.
119.
Id. at 436-37, 457 (“([T]he same doctrine as to the dominion and
sovereignty over and ownership of lands under the navigable waters of the Great
Lakes applies which obtains at the common law as to the dominion and sovereignty
over and ownership of lands under tide waters in the borders of the sea, and that the
lands are held . . . subject to the same trusts and limitations. Upon that theory we
shall examine how far dominion, sovereignty, and proprietary right have been
encroached upon by the railroad company”).
120.
Id. at 452.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. Justice Field emphasized the special nature of the state’s obligation as
a trustee of the submerged lands. Id. at 454 (“So with trusts connected with public
property, or property of a special character, like lands under navigable waters; they
cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the state.”)
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responsibilities to a state effort to abdicate its police powers123 confirmed
the linkage between the public trust and the essential sovereign character of
a state124 because the comparison demonstrated how state ownership of
trust lands, like state police power, is an inalienable responsibility of all
states by virtue of their sovereignty.125
Consistent with the nature of the state’s ownership of sovereign lands,
Justice Field announced the rule of Illinois Central: The public trust operates
as a restraint on alienation.
The trust devolving upon the State for the public . . . cannot be
relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the
State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to
such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public
therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining.126
Illinois Central thus established that a state may not abdicate its trust
responsibilities through a transfer of property to private interests. This
general rule is subject to two exceptions: a state may alienate trust lands
when: 1) the transfer promotes the public interest, or 2) the transfer of land
does not substantially impair the public trust.127 Applying this rule, the
court concluded the 1869 transfer to the railroad was inoperative.128

123.
Id. at 453 (“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which
the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to
leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . than it can
abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation
of the peace.”).
124.
Id. at 453.
125.
The Supreme Court had earlier analogized the sovereign power of
governance to a trust duty in Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879). In Stone, the
Mississippi legislature had granted a charter to a lottery company in 1867, only to
outlaw lotteries via state constitutional amendment in 1868. Id. at 816. The Court
held that the adoption of the state constitutional provision, which effectively
repealed the lottery charter did not violate the contracts clause of the United States
Constitution, because a state government cannot divest itself of its power to protect
“public health or the public morals” because “the power of governing is a trust
committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away.”
Id. at 819, 820. Consequently, the company accepted the lottery charter with the
implicit understanding that it could be removed as necessary for the state to guard
the public good. Id. at 821.
126.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
127.
Id.
128.
Id. at 460. Justice Field was particularly concerned about the 1869 Lake
Front Act’s potential for allowing the railroad to exercise monopolistic control over
the harbor by giving the railroad the power to “delay indefinitely the improvement of
the harbor,” and allowing it to make and renew leases for any period. Id. at 451. He
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Illinois Central built on the principles enunciated in Martin, Pollard, Weber,
and McCready by defining a key substantive obligation imposed by the public
trust doctrine on states as trustees of submerged lands for the public namely, that state control over trust resources must fulfill their trust
obligations.129 Justice Field drew heavily on the federal principles of equal
footing and the nature of state sovereignty over public lands to articulate a
generic rule of when a state may abdicate control of its lands consistent with
its trust responsibilities, suggesting that the restraint against alienation has
its roots in federal common law.

IV. Explaining the Origins of the Illinois Central Restraint
Against Alienation
In light of the case law laying the foundation for Illinois Central, and the
language and rationale of the opinion itself, federal common law provides
the best explanation for the source of the Illinois Central rule against
unqualified alienation of trust lands. This section first explores competing
theories for the source of the Illinois Central public trust doctrine and explains
why those explanations prove unpersuasive when tested against the
language and rationale of the Illinois Central decision. Next, the section
articulates why interpreting the Illinois Central public trust doctrine as
grounded in federal common law is consistent with both the text and
reasoning of the decision, and why a federal common law reading of Illinois
Central provides the case with continuing legitimacy, even after the Supreme
Court’s 1938 Erie Railroad130 decision which limited the reach of federal
common law.

A. Eliminating Unpersuasive Theories
The language used by Justice Field in Illinois Central contradicts the
theory that the Illinois Central restraint on alienation is a statement of state

saw the Act as essentially converting the public harbor into a private asset the
railroad could use “not simply for its own purpose as a railroad corporation, but for
its own profit generally.” Id. at 451. Illinois Central thus serves as an example of how
Justice Field’s anti-monopoly perspective contributed to his wariness of government
attempts to alienate its powers to private corporations. See C.M.A. McCauliff,
Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Complementary or Rival Modes of
Discourse?, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 302 (1988) (“Field felt that private business should
neither be subsidized by government nor subject to its regulation, and that
government has the duty, on the one hand, not to interfere in private business and,
on the other hand, not to alienate its powers, privileges, or publicly-owned property.
Both views reach essentially the same conclusions, differing, however, in their
emphasis on political or jurisprudential terminology.”).
129.
See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
130.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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law.131 First, nowhere in the opinion does the Court rely on Illinois state
court precedent, despite existing decisions on the issue.132 In contrast,
Justice Field cited only to statements of federal common law addressing the
nature of state ownership of trust lands.133 Second, language of the Illinois
Central opinion discussed generic characteristics of state dominion and
sovereignty over lands below navigable waters,134 not characteristics
uniquely held by Illinois. A similar analysis of the case’s language and
rationale led Professor Wilkinson to conclude there is little doubt that the
Illinois Central decision was “premised on federal law.”135
However, Wilkinson’s explanation that the public trust derives from
either congressional preemption or the Commerce Clause136 seems
unpersuasive.
Wilkinson first argued that the trust is based on
congressional preemption because the language in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 and in multiple statehood acts guarantee that rivers shall
be “forever free.”137 In the alternative, Wilkinson contended that authority
can be found in the Commerce Clause as an implied limit on state authority
paralleling the navigation servitude.138
Both explanations prove
131.
For arguments that Illinois Central is a statement of state law, see Pearson,
supra note 6, at 740 (arguing that “states should view Illinois Central as persuasive,
rather than mandatory authority”); Grant, supra note 5, at 851 (arguing that a close
reading of Illinois Central reveals it was based on the reserved powers doctrine under
state law, which relates to, but is not limited by, the Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution).
132.
See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 6, at 728 (discussing an 1884 Illinois Supreme
Court decision in Parker v. State, 111 Ill. 581 (1884) that addressed the state’s power to
make a grant of rights involving lands below navigable waters); Kearney & Merrill,
supra note 5, at 829-30 (citing prior Illinois case law articulating how private rights in
submerged lands are subject to the public’s paramount interest in navigation).
Justice Field’s choice to ignore Illinois state law, despite the availability of state
authority on the nature of public and private rights in submerged lands, and instead
to rely on previous United States Supreme Court decisions, suggests the decision’s
origins lie with federal, not state, law. But see Grant, supra note 5, at 865 (arguing
Field’s citations to case law reflected a use of all available cases, state or federal, for
the purposes of “discerning state law on the validity and terms of the 1869 grant”).
133.
See discussion supra Section II (discussing the four major cases providing
the foundation for the Illinois Central opinion).
134.
146 U.S. 387, 435, 437, 452-53 (1892).
135.
Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 454-55 (noting the parties were arguing
principles of general applicability, the briefs relied on cases from multiple states, the
opinion itself refers to “a state” and not to Illinois).
136.
See id. at 456-59.
137.
Id. at 456-57.
138.
Id. at 458-59. As articulated by Wilkinson, the federal navigational
servitude, which originates in Congress’ authority to regulate commerce in interstate
waters, “allows the United States to condemn land, including state land, up to the
high water mark [of navigable waters] without being required to pay just
compensation.” Id. at 449.
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unsatisfactory because they do not explain the Illinois Central court’s reliance
on the equal footing doctrine Additionally, reliance on congressional
preemption or the Commerce Clause misconstrues the public trust doctrine
as centering on the relationship between Congress and the states, rather
than, as articulated in Illinois Central (and earlier in Martin and McCready), on
the relationship between the state and the public.139 Further, because the
Illinois Central court plainly relied on equal footing, any persuasive theory
explaining the origins of the Illinois Central public trust must recognize and
incorporate the equal footing doctrine.140
Professor Rasband has argued the equal footing doctrine and the
public trust doctrine are so closely intertwined that they should not be
articulated as two separate “doctrinal constructs,”141 and that the public trust
doctrine should give way to the equal footing doctrine.142 Rasband
characterized the equal footing doctrine as a presumption against United
States’ intent to convey submerged lands in pre-statehood grants,143 and the
public trust doctrine as “defin[ing] a state’s power over the land under
navigable water that it acquired at statehood.”144 Essentially, Rasband
argued that requiring courts to apply two separate standards for grants of
submerged lands - the rebuttable presumption intent analysis to prestatehood conveyances by the United States, and the question of sovereign
power to convey under the Illinois Central doctrine - creates irreconcilable

139.
See id. at 452-53 (discussing the relationship between the trust
responsibilities and a state’s obligations to maintain them); Martin, 41 U.S. 367, 416
(1842) (discussing how the “prerogatives and regalities” of the crown now lie with the
state as representative of the people); McCready, 94 U.S. 391, 394-96 (1876)
(discussing the relationship between the state citizenry and Virginia’s regulation of
public trust rights).
140.
E.g., Harrison Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American
Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 524 (1989) (recognizing the “close link” between the
public trust and the equal footing doctrine because of their shared emphasis on
issues of state sovereignty over submerged lands).
141.
Rasband, supra note 13, at 4, 5 (“[T]he separation of the two doctrines is
driven more by ideology than legal necessity.”). Rasband characterized the public
trust doctrine as a creature of state common law and the equal footing doctrine as
federal common law. Id.
142.
Id. at 7. To choose between the two doctrines, Rasband invoked practical
considerations, arguing that “the approach in public trust cases has less historical
support, unreasonably defeats investment-backed expectations of grantees, risks
takings challenges, and, by requiring judges to divine the public interest . . . forces
them to engage in a task for which they are not particularly well-suited.” Id.
143.
See id. at 3 (“The equal footing doctrine defines the United States’ power
to convey or retain land under navigable water prior to statehood and therefore
describes the lands under navigable waters which a state acquires at statehood.”).
144.
Id. at 3.
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conflicts.145
Professor Rasband contended the public trust doctrine and equal
footing doctrine analysis should be collapsed into a single inquiry.146
However, the two inquires must remain separate because the former
analyzes issues of state power, while the latter resolves questions of federal
intent.147 Moreover, Rasband’s approach mistakenly conflated the “trust” in
which the United States held pre-statehood lands for the states with the
“trust” in which the states hold the lands for the public. The two “trusts” are
not interchangeable because they inject different content to three key
elements of a trust relationship - trustee, corpus, and beneficiary.148 Under
the equal footing doctrine, the United States is the trustee;149 under the
public trust doctrine, that role belongs to the states.150 The character of the
trust corpus under the equal footing doctrine was temporary,151 whereas in
the public trust doctrine, trustee duty is permanent.152 Finally, the
beneficiaries of the pre-statehood equal footing trust were the yet unformed

145.
Id. at 7, 84 (“[O]ne cannot consistently advocate the presumption
approach to pre-statehood United States’ grants and simultaneously support the
public trust approach to state grants. The two approaches conflict[.]”). However,
when the equal footing doctrine is viewed as the mechanism by which the public
trust rights and responsibilities passed from the Crown to the states, any perceived
conflict between the doctrine dissipates.
146.
Id. at 4.
147.
Compare Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 554 (1981) (applying
presumption against pre-statehood conveyances by the federal government to land
under a riverbed unless intent is clear and plain) with Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 453
(1892) (analyzing whether a state has power to completely alienate trust lands).
148.
See BOGERT ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed. 1965) (describing
the trust property, the trustee, and beneficiary as three elements of a trust
relationship); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON TRUSTS § 3 (2003) (“[1] The property held in trust
is the trust property. [2] the person who holds property in trust is the trustee. [3] A
person for whose benefit property is held in trust is a beneficiary”).
149.
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 221, 224 (1845)
150.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The control of the state for the
purposes of the trust can never be lost,” except for conveyances that promote or do
not substantially impair the public interest.).
151.
Pollard, 44 U.S. at 221, 224.
152.
One of the purposes of the Northwest Ordinance was for the lands ceded
by the Eastern states to “be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of
all the United States, to be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and
for no other use or purpose whatever” as repayment for the war debt and to erect
new states. Id at 221. Thus, retention by the United States of federal public domain
lands within the states at the time of statehood did not offend equal footing because
the states and federal government viewed such retention for “temporary purposes”
relating to development of the country and because the heart of equal footing relates
to territorial sovereignty as a political principle, not as an absolute percentage of
acreage. See id. at 223.
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states,153 while the beneficiaries of the public trust doctrine are members of
the public.154 Because the elements and the analysis of the equal footing
doctrine and the public trust doctrine significantly diverge, the two doctrines
cannot be conflated, but must remain distinct.
Further, Rasband’s approach highlighted a fundamental reason why
the equal footing doctrine, standing alone, cannot provide a complete
explanation for the public trust doctrine as articulated in Illinois Central.
Equal footing centers on the transfer of submerged lands from the federal
government to the new states - and the pre-statehood trust relationship
between the United States and future states - but it fails to explain the
nature of the title received by the states upon transfer, or any accompanying
limitations on the states’ ability to convey that title.155 In short, equal
footing explains how, but not what. By contrast, a satisfactory explanation of
Illinois Central must explain how and why the Illinois Central Court concluded
that the content of the public trust included a restriction on alienability.

B. Developing a Persuasive Explanation for the Source of
the Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine
Although most commentators have dismissed the idea that federal
common law provides the source for the Illinois Central public trust
doctrine,156 federal common law actually provides the most compelling
explanation for the origins of the Illinois Central public trust doctrine.157
153.
Id. at 221, 224.
154.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 483.
155.
See Grant, supra note 5, at 852-53. Professor Grant explained that “[f]or the
equal footing doctrine to serve as the basis of the public trust doctrine, an additional
premise is necessary . . . . The additional premise is that the implied federal transfer
of title to beds of navigable waters came with strings attached, namely, that the
states took them with responsibility to protect the public right of use and with
limitations on their power to dispose of them into private ownership.” Id. Grant
called this premise “logically problematic” because it does not explain how and what
constraints the public trust doctrine places on the original 13 states. Id. at 853.
However, the Martin Court’s explanation of how public trust duties passed directly
from the Crown to the original thirteen colonies seemed to have resolved this
concern. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
156.
See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 455 (considering the possibility that
the federal public trust doctrine could explained by federal law before rejecting it
because it “is not in favor and is unlikely to be employed”); Pearson, supra note 6, at
733 (arguing federal common law cannot explain Illinois Central because Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. 1 (1842) carved out an exception for the local law of real property, and
because Illinois Central “cannot continue to lay claim to legitimacy on that basis” since
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins abolished the federal common law doctrine).
157.
Federal common law arises when the courts engage in “fashioning federal
rules applicable to . . . federal questions.” Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, 367 (1943). In other words, federal common law develops when a court bases its
rule of decision on judicial interpretation of the meaning of a federal statutory or
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Because federal common law is widely viewed as a discredited source of law
in a post-Erie Railroad v. Tompkins judicial world,158 this section first addresses
circumstances that justify reliance on federal common law post-Erie. It then
explains how the Illinois Central decision meets the requirements of valid
federal common law, and why the text of the Illinois Central opinion supports
a federal common law interpretation.
Although Erie Railroad v. Tompkins159 overruled Swift v. Tyson,160 the Erie
decision did not eliminate the ability of courts to develop federal common
law when implicitly authorized by a positive law source, such as a statute or
the Constitution.161 Both Swift and Erie interpreted section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789,162 which provides that “the laws of several states” provide the
rules of decision in cases where they apply.163 The difference between the

constitutional provision. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)
(“Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express [federal] statutory mandates.
Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy
of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy . . . .
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law.”); Cf. Atherton v.
FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (describing federal common law as a “rule of decision
that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute or a properly
promulgated administrative rule, but, rather, to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special
federal rule of decision”).
158.
See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 885 (1986) (explaining how Erie appeared to question the
legitimacy of federal common law, and that the “received academic tradition on
federal common law assumes that there are particular enclaves in which federal
common law is in fact appropriate, but that after Erie, federal common law power is
the exception, not the rule”).
159.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (overruling Swift by rejecting
the idea that there is a floating transcendent body of law that federal courts can use
their powers to discover).
160.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842) (holding the Rules of Decision Act’s
requirement that federal courts apply state law “is strictly limited to local statutes
and local usages of the character before stated, and does not extend to contracts and
other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof
are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.”).
161.
See Field, supra note 159, at 928 (1986) (“All of the cases allowing federal
common law are reconcilable with Erie on the basis that the federal common law
there made was authorized by some provision . . . . Deciding whether common law
can be made in any given case is a matter of interpreting each possible enabling
authority to see whether or not it supports federal common law.”).
162.
For the modern-day equivalent of the provision, see 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2000) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.”)
163.
Field, supra note 159, at 928; see Id. at 902-903 (describing how Swift and
Erie turned on opposing interpretations of the Rules of Decision Act).
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two cases was that Swift interpreted the phrase “the laws of several states” to
include both positive law and natural law, while Erie limited this phrase as
applying only to positive law.164 The result of Erie is that courts may no
longer use natural law165 to create general federal common law rules of
decisions, but may still fashion non-general federal common law when
interpretation of a provision of positive law so requires.166 Under the current
United States Supreme Court approach, a federal court may create nongeneral federal common law when “relevant federal interest warrants the
displacement of state law.”167

164.
See Field, supra note 159, at 928. The Erie decision recognized that the
Swift approach had not produced the desired uniformity regarding law governing
commercial transactions. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
165.
See Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (explaining that the fallacy underlying the
Swift rule was to assume there was a transcendent body of natural law principles that
exist independently of positive sources of law); see also Stone Grissom, Diversity
Jurisdiction: An Open Dialogue in Dual Sovereignty, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 372, 383 n. 56 (“The
Erie decision marked a jurisprudential shift from the idea of natural law to legal
positivism.”).
166.
See Field, supra note 159, at 928; see also PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
EDS., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 15 (5th ed. 2004)
(“Notwithstanding legislative primacy in law-making, there are occasions when
federal courts make federal common law and when it is generally (though not
unanimously) accepted they should do so.”).
167.
Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 692 (2007) (citing
Boyle v. United Tech. Co., 487 U.S. 500, 504-07 (1988) (also framing the inquiry as
whether state law significantly conflicts with a unique federal interest, warranting
displacement of state law). The Supreme Court has also recognized the nature of the
federal governmental structure may require the Court to create federal common law.
See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (deciding,
on the same day as Erie Railroad, that federal common law provided the rule of
decision for determining the appropriateness of judicial apportionment of interstate
waters).
Thus, although express application of federal common law is not frequently
invoked by the modern Supreme Court, it has not fallen into desuetude. For
example, the Court has frequently applied federal common law to interstate disputes
over use of water bodies or apportionment of interstate waters. E.g., id.; Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103, 107-08 (1972) (remitting a suit to abate a public nuisance
in interstate or navigable waters under the Clean Water Act with authority to fashion
an appropriate federal common law remedy); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 562
(1963), overrul’d on other grounds by California v United States, 438 US 645, 646 (1978)
(“Resolution of this [interstate water dispute between Arizona and California]
requires a determination of what apportionment, if any, is made by the Project Act
and what powers are conferred by the Act upon the Secretary of the Interior. Unless
many of the issues presented here are adjudicated, the conflicting claims of the
parties will continue, as they do now, to raise serious doubts as to the extent of each
State’s right to appropriate water from the Colorado River System for existing or new
uses. In this situation we should and do exercise our jurisdiction.”). In some
respects, the federal interests compelling creation of the Illinois Central public trust
doctrine were similar to the federal interests behind creation of a federal common
139

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010

In short, two requirements must be met for federal common law to
function as a persuasive explanation of the Illinois Central restraint on
alienation.168 First, the Illinois Central rule of decision restraining alienation
must have derived from a constitutional or statutory provision requiring
judicial interpretation. Second, there must have been a relevant federal
interest that merited the Illinois Central Court’s displacement of Illinois state
public trust law as the rule of decision.169
The positive source of law authorizing the Illinois Central rule against
alienation was the equal footing doctrine. Justice Field relied heavily on the
concept of equal footing: that new states enter the Union on equal political
footing, with the same attributes of dominion and sovereignty.170 In Coyle v.
Smith, the Supreme Court confirmed the equal footing doctrine is
constitutional in nature, deriving the doctrine from the language in Article 4,
section 3 of Constitution calling for admittance of new states into “this
Union.”171 Thus, the Illinois Central public trust doctrine, which articulated the
law rule for interstate apportionment of water rights because both focus on use of
public resources, and in both cases the need for a federal common law remedy was
the product of the apportionment of power between the federal government and the
states, detailed in the Constitution.
168.
The Illinois Central opinion was not entirely devoid of natural law
reasoning, and the Supreme Court would not likely articulate the same reasoning if it
decided the case again today. See generally George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney,
The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 307, 322 (2006) (discussing natural law undertones of Illinois Central
opinion). Analyzing the federal common law rule of Illinois Central to determine
whether it meets the modern test is merely intended to show how the Illinois Central
common law rule retains its legitimacy even today.
169.
The Swift exception that state law traditionally governs “rights and titles to
things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate,” Swift,
41 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1842); see id., does not apply determine the law governing the public
trust doctrine, even though the public trust doctrine involves the nature of a state’s
title in submerged lands because it is not the type of local property law referred to by
the exception. Additionally, as discussed infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text,
the public trust doctrine does not fall into the Swift real property exception because it
stems not from state law but from federal common law that governs the state’s
public trust duties in its capacity as a sovereign member of “this Union.”
170.
See discussion supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
171.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“New states may be admitted by Congress into this
Union . . . .”); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911). In Coyle, a citizen of Oklahoma
challenged an act of the Oklahoma legislature providing for the relocation of the
state capitol from Guthrie to Oklahoma. Id. at 563-64. The United States upheld the
validity of the Act, holding the guarantees of political sovereignty embodied in equal
footing included the power of a state to locate and change its seat of government. Id.
at 565-66. In its holding, the Court characterized the constitutional text of “this
Union” as referring to “a union of states, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution itself.” Id. at 567; see also Rasband, supra note 13, at 56 (arguing the
only “coherent” way of explaining the equal footing doctrine case law is “to recognize
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nature of the state’s trusteeship over submerged lands, derives from an
interpretation of the rights and responsibilities that attach to the admission
of a sovereign state to the Article 4, section 3 language of “this Union.”172
Federal interests in uniformity and preservation of state sovereignty
provided ample justifications for the result in Illinois Central concerning the
state’s title to public trust lands. The federal government has a unique
interest in ensuring states are admitted to the Union on equal terms and in
uniformly defining the equal footing concept to fulfill the equal footing
guarantee of political equality.173 Further, the federal interest in ensuring
that states retain sovereign trusteeship over submerged lands fosters the
federal interest in keeping watercourses free for public use.174 In sum, the
Illinois Central Court fashioned a federal common law remedy preventing the
state from abdicating sovereign control over submerged lands by prohibiting
conveyances that impair the public trust.
A close examination of the text of the Illinois Central opinion confirms
that federal common law is the source of the public trust doctrine. Although
Justice Field did not expressly tie his analysis to any constitutional
provision, federal common law explains the link he drew between equal
footing and the principle of the public trust as a restraint on alienation.175

that Congress is indeed constitutionally obligated to admit a new state with
sovereignty equal to that of all other states . . . .”).
172.
See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, Forward: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1975) (“The ultimate source of judicial lawmaking
authority is the constitutional text.”). An analogous situation lies in the willingness
of federal courts to strike down state legislation under the so-called “dormant
commerce clause” where state laws conflict with the free trade philosophy embodied
in the Commerce Clause, demonstrating the ability of the federal courts to create
non-general federal common law under implicit authorization from the text of the
Constitution. See LOW & JEFFERIES, supra note 167, at 17 (citing Monaghan).
173.
Allowing state law to define the nature of the equal footing doctrine
would be inappropriate, because it would result in potentially fifty different
interpretations, which runs directly contrary to the equal footing premise of ensuring
uniform political rights and responsibilities for all states. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
212, 222 (1845).
In Oregon v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977), the Court applied
state law, rather than federal common law, to govern the issue of whether state
sovereign title followed with post-statehood accretions and avulsions. Id. at 367-68.
However, the Court noted that federal common law would still have applied to
determine whether, at the time of the state’s admission, the lands passed to the
state under the equal footing doctrine, explaining that “the contrary approach would
result in a perverse application of the equal footing doctrine.” Id. at 377-78.
174.
See Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 431-38 (discussing the importance of free
travel on U.S. watercourses for trade, transportation, and commerce).
175.
Justice Field explained that under the equal footing doctrine, states took
title to the lands subjects to the same trusts as held by the Crown. Illinois Central, 146
U.S. 387, 436-37. Trusteeship over submerged lands followed from the responsibility
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Both are grounded in Article IV, section 3 of the United States Constitution,
which grants Congress the authority to admit new states. Equal footing is
the federal common law that explains how new states obtained title to the
submerged lands, while the public trust doctrine is the federal common law
explains what obligations accompanied that title by virtue of a state’s
position as a sovereign within “this Union.”176 The nineteenth century
jurisprudential focus on natural law helps explain why Justice Field did not
explicitly tie his reasoning to a textual provision of the United States
Constitution: a lack of explicit references to positive law was a hallmark of
opinions written in the natural law tradition.177 A federal common law basis
for the public trust doctrine deriving from a constitutional provision also
explains how the rule could operate as a limitation on state legislative
power.178 In sum, federal common law supplies a persuasive explanation for

of a state, as sovereign, to govern for the common good, and consequently
functioned to restrict alienation of trust resources. See id. at 453.
176.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
177.
See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 54 (2000) (“[T]he American jurisprudents did
not expressly think of themselves as Platonists. Many of them failed to precisely
define natural law and natural rights, much less delineate the relations between
natural law and positive law, including case decisions.”); see also Epstein, supra note 5,
at 427 (commenting that “Field work[ed] very much in the ‘natural’ or ‘higher’ law
tradition. Illinois Central contains no citations to [a] particular constitutional
provision, and the opinion reads like an essay that runs for 20 pages without case
citation.”) (citations omitted); Cf. Rasband, supra note 13, at 65 (“Field made no
attempt to locate in the Constitution this new constraint on legislative power.
Instead, in fine pre-Erie form, he turned to the common law.”); Sax, supra note 1, at
490 (commenting that “[t]he Court in Illinois Central did not specify its reasons for
adopting the position which it took, but the attitude implicit in the decision is fairly
obvious” that “governments operate in order to provide widely available public
services, such as schools, police protection, liberties, and parks.”)
Justice Field’s natural law values included a concern for preserving public rights
from the hands of a private monopoly. See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 169, at 321
(arguing that the Illinois Central public trust reflects natural law values within the
American constitutional framework that when balanced, “implicitly require
protection of the navigable waterways.”); McCurdy, supra note 105, at 266
(“Throughout his entire judicial career, Field believed that . . . the courts were
capable of resolving allocation problems so as to simultaneously protect property
rights, release entrepreneurial energies, and provide all men with an equal
opportunity to share in the material fruits of a vigorously-expanding capitalist
society.”). Because the Illinois Central public trust doctrine can be independently
explained on federal common law grounds, Justice Field’s partial reliance on natural
law does not undermine the continuing validity of Illinois Central.
178.
Cf. Rasband, supra note 13, at 65 n.243 (“The absence of a constitutional
basis for the public trust rule of Illinois Central has been the subject of much
commentary for the obvious reason that the rule works as a limitation on the power
of the legislature something [that] the [English or state] common law theoretically
cannot do.”).
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the language and rationale of Illinois Central.

V. Reconciling Illinois Central and Subsequent Supreme
Court Decisions
A trilogy of subsequent Supreme Court decisions exist that, at first
glance, appear to have limited, undermined, or implicitly overruled Illinois
Central’s limit on state conveyance of trust lands, and seem to support the
notion that the Illinois Central public trust doctrine is not based on federal
law.179 But properly understood, none of these decisions erode the Illinois
Central rule of decision restricting the state’s ability to abdicate sovereign
control over submerged lands. Instead, these later decisions can be
distinguished as resolving issues distinct from those presented in Illinois
Central. Moreover, the principles articulated in these cases are not
inconsistent with the Illinois Central federal rule against alienation of
sovereign control of public trust lands.

A. Shively v. Bowlby: The Court Considers the Validity of
Pre-Statehood Federal Grants of Submerged Lands
In 1894, two years after Illinois Central, the Supreme Court decided
Shively v. Bowlby, a case involving competing claims by private landowners to
lands submerged under the Columbia River in Astoria, Oregon.180 After
Charles Shively dedicated his title in streets adjacent to the lands to the
public, John Bowlby brought a quiet title action against Shively in the circuit
court for Clatsop County, Oregon to remove the cloud on his title
effectuated by the dedication,181 and Shively counterclaimed for quiet title.182
Shively claimed title under a pre-statehood federal Oregon Donation Act
claim executed in 1850,183 and perfected by an 1865 federal patent.184 Bowlby
claimed title under an 1876 deed issued by the state of Oregon.185 After the
trial court ruled for Bowlby, Shively appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court,
which affirmed the trial court’s decision on the basis that Shively’s federal
grant conveyed no title or right to lands below the high-water mark.186

179.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364
(1926); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); See, e.g., Pearson, supra
note 6, at 736-37 (arguing Shively marked a retreat from Illinois Central and that Appleby
“overruled” or “severely limited” the Illinois Central holding).
180.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 2 (1894).
181.
Id. at 2, 7.
182.
Id. at 7.
183.
Oregon Donation Act, Act of Congress of Sept. 27, 1850, chap. 76, 9 Stat. 496.
184.
Shively, 152 U.S. at 2.
185.
Id.
186.
Id. at 8.
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Shively then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.187
A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed.188 The Court ruled that Shively’s
federal donation land grant and subsequent patent did not include title to
lands below the high-water mark because construing general pre-statehood
land grants to settlers to convey title to submerged lands would impair the
sovereignty of newly admitted states.189 Consequently, the Court held that
Bowlby’s title to the lands via conveyance from the state of Oregon
prevailed.190
The Court referenced Illinois Central as one in a string of cases
establishing principles governing ownership of sovereign lands,191 citing the
decision for the general principle applicable to “the several states” that a
state may dispose of sovereignty over tidelands or submerged lands only
when that disposal does not impair the public trust.192 The Court also
recognized that, after statehood, states regulate the uses of public trust
lands, subject only to constitutional limitations.193
The Shively decision was entirely consistent with a federal common law
reading of Illinois Central grounded in federal common law because the Shively
Court viewed the rule of Illinois Central as “the settled law of this country,”
applicable to all states, not just to Illinois.194 Further, the Shively Court

187.
Id.
188.
Id. at 58.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. “Grants by congress of portions of the public lands within a territory to
settlers thereon, though bordering on or bounded by navigable waters, convey, of
their own force, no title or right below high-water mark, and do not impair the title and
dominion of the future state, when created, but leave the question of the use of the
shores by the owners of uplands to the sovereign control of each state, subject only
to the rights vested by the constitution in the United States.” Id. (emphasis added).
191.
Id. at 46-47. Reviewing a lengthy chain of cases beginning with Martin v.
Waddell, the Court surveyed the laws in the thirteen original colonies and discussed
relevant nineteenth century Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id. at 15-47. The Shively
Court drew the general conclusion from its examination of the laws and practices in
the thirteen original states that each of these states “has dealt with the lands under
the tide waters within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy,
reserving its own control over such lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or
corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as considered for the best
interests of the public.” Id. at 26. Thus, the Shively court recognized a uniform
requirement that considerations of the public interest drive state decisions regarding
control of submerged lands, even though the power to rule on the validity of such a
conveyance remains within the purview of each individual state.
192.
Id. at 47.
193.
Id. at 58. Under the interpretation that the public trust doctrine is
grounded in federal common law deriving from the equal footing clause of the
Constitution, the Shively Court’s statement that there are constitutional limits on
state regulation of trust lands includes limits imposed by the public trust doctrine.
194.
Id. at 47.
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applied Illinois Central’s sovereignty rhetoric.195 Nothing about the listing of
Illinois Central as only one of many cases developing the public trust doctrine
undermines the vitality of the Illinois Central decision;196 indeed, the Shively
Court recognized Illinois Central as the leading authority regarding trust
restraints on states’ complete abdication of state control of trust lands.197
Instead, Shively cited multiple public trust cases to trace, in some detail, the
development of the American public trust jurisprudence, culminating its
discussion with Illinois Central.198 Finally, the general principle drawn by the
Shively Court, that “the title and the control of [submerged lands] are vested
in the sovereign, for the benefit of the whole people”199 is entirely consistent
with the language and rationale of Illinois Central. Shively is thus properly read
as reinforcing the trust relationship that was the basis for the Illinois Central
restraint on alienation.

B.

Appleby v. City of New York: The Court Upholds a
Conveyance of Submerged Lands that Does Not
Substantially Impair the Public Trust

In 1853, the City of New York issued a deed for approximately a blockand-a-half plat of submerged land beneath the Hudson River to Charles
Appleby in exchange for Appleby’s agreement to build four wharves, fill
necessary lands, and not to build without permission from the city.200 The
state legislature subsequently passed laws prohibiting private fill or
bulkhead construction in certain areas and requiring state approval for
construction of docks, thereby preventing Appleby’s ability to fill in the
plat.201 In 1914, Appleby sued the city and the lessees of the city’s piers,
maintaining that the state laws wrongly impaired city’s obligations of

195.
Id. at 57.
196.
One commentator perceived Shively as undermining Illinois Central because
the Shively court listed Illinois Central as only one of many cases giving content to the
nature of state sovereignty in submerged lands. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 737
(“Significantly, Illinois Central received no more attention from the Court than the
other cases in the post-Martin era, and the Court did not refer to Illinois Central as a
break from precedent. Thus, only two years after deciding Illinois Central, the Court
viewed it as simply the last in a consistent line of cases and of no particular singular
significance within that line.”)
197.
Shively, 152 U.S. at 47.
198.
Id.
199.
Id. at 57.
200.
Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1926). The city issued the
deed after approval by the state legislature in 1845. Id. at 366. New York City
exercised general control over a strip of land below the high water line, surrounding
Manhattan by virtue of pre-statehood grants confirmed by an 1807 act of the
legislature. Id.
201.
Id. at 371.
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contract and seeking an injunction restraining the city and its lessees from
dredging the lands or using his lands as a slip for mooring.202 After a New
York trial court denied Appleby’s injunction request and the state appellate
courts affirmed, Appleby appealed to the United States Supreme Court.203
The Supreme Court reversed.204 In an opinion delivered by Chief
Justice Taft, the Court held that the public trust doctrine did not apply to
restrict Appleby’s private ownership rights in the submerged lands because
the City intended to, and effectively did, convey both jus publicum and jus
privatum interests in the 1853 grant to Appleby, thereby extinguishing the
public trust in Appleby’s plat of submerged lands.205 The Court rejected the
city’s plea to apply Illinois Central to invalidate its 1853 grant to Appleby,
referring to Illinois Central as “necessarily a statement of Illinois law,”206 but
recognizing that “the general principle and the exception have been
recognized the country over and have been approved in several cases in the
state of New York.207 Instead, the Appleby Court drew a “distinction” between
the facts in Appleby and the facts in Illinois Central and two New York cases
where the courts had invalidated grants conveying massive tracts of
submerged lands to the control of private companies.208 The Court thus

202.
Id. at 371, 379. The suit was actually brought by the executors of
Appleby’s estate. Id. at 365.
203.
Id.
204.
Id. at 403.
205.
Id. at 397.
206.
Id. at 393.
207.
Id. at 394. Because the Appleby Court ultimately declined to apply Illinois
Central, distinguishing Appleby on its facts, the statement that the case is “necessarily
a statement of state law” is mere dicta, because it is not essential to the court’s
holding or reasoning.
208.
Id. at 393-96. The Appleby Court characterized Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387
(1892), as a case where Supreme Court invalidated a state legislature’s attempt to
convey over 1,000 acres of the Chicago harbor to a private railroad because the
conveyance was a “gross perversion of the trust over the property under which it was
held, [and] an abdication of sovereign governmental power.” Appleby, 271 U.S. at 393.
Similarly, the Appleby Court considered two New York cases that had invalidated
conveyances via application of the Illinois Central rule. Id. at 396 (emphasizing “the
distinction between the Illinois Central, the Coxe, and the Long Sault cases and grants
like those we are considering. It is clear that the ruling in those cases has no
application here.”) (italics added).
The facts underlying the first case, Illinois Central, are discussed supra text
accompanying notes 86-94. In the second case, Coxe v. New York, 39 N.E. 400 (N.Y.
1895), the state supreme court affirmed the invalidity of a law giving a private marsh
land corporation eminent domain authorities over all wet and overflowed lands
adjacent to Staten Island and Long Island. Third, in Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 105
N.E. 849 (N.Y. 1914) the state supreme court invalidated a grant by the legislature
that would have given “complete control of the navigation of the St. Lawrence river in
the region of Long Sault Rapids to a private corporation and abdicate its sovereign
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ruled that Appleby could enjoin the city’s dredging and use of the
submerged lands.209
The Appleby result, upholding a grant of a block-and-a-half plat of
submerged lands to a private landowner, is not inconsistent with Illinois
Central because the scope of Appleby’s grant was small compared to the
grant at issue in Illinois Central, and therefore lacked the abdication of
sovereign control present with the Illinois Central railroad grant. Although
the Appleby Court did not clearly explain its rationale, the most textually
grounded reading is that the Appleby Court declined to invoke the Illinois
Central rule to invalidate the city’s deed to Appleby because the deed fell
within the first exception articulated in Illinois Central: Namely, that a state
may abdicate sovereign control over submerged lands - relinquishing public
trust responsibilities - when the conveyance to a private entity does not
substantially impair the public trust.210 Under this interpretation, Appleby did
not overrule nor undermine Illinois Central; instead the Court implicitly
applied an exception to the Illinois Central rule to uphold the 1853 deed to
Appleby.

C. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: The Court Officially
Extends the Public Trust to Non-navigable Tidewaters
In 1973, the Mississippi state legislature charged the state marine
resources council with preparing maps identifying state-owned wetlands.211
In 1997, relying on these maps, the Mississippi Mineral Lease Commission
issued an oil and gas lease covering 600 acres of lands submerged below the
north branch of Bayou LaCroix and other tidally influenced drainage
streams.212 Record titleholders, including Phillips Petroleum, who traced
their claim of title from pre-statehood Spanish land grants confirmed by
federal and state patents, learned of the leases and sued the state to remove

function.” Appleby, 271 U.S. at 396. Although the Appleby Court did not elucidate on
the “distinction” it perceived between these three cases and the facts in Appleby, the
clearest distinction is that the earlier three cases involved large-scale conveyances to
entire sections of city harbors that almost inherently will impair the state’s public
trustee responsibilities, as opposed to the facts in Appleby where the City conveyed
only a single plat of land to a private land owner for purposes (fill, construction of a
wharf) that could even have been perceived as furthering public uses. In essence, the
Appleby conveyance did not offend the Illinois Central rule because it fell into the
exception that a state may effectuate conveyances that do not substantially impair
the public trust.
209.
Id. at 402-03.
210.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
211.
Cinque Bambini P’ship v. Mississippi, 491 So.2d 508, 511 (Miss. 1986), aff’d sub
nom. Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1998). Once prepared, the maps
were recorded with local chancery clerks. Id.
212.
Id. at 511; Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472.
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clouds of title.213 The state counterclaimed, asserting public trust ownership
of the lands on the basis of the equal footing doctrine.214 After the trial court
rejected the titleholders’ argument that the state held title only to lands
under navigable waters, not waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, it
ruled for the state, and the state supreme court affirmed.215 The record
titleholders appealed to the United States Supreme Court.216
The Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of 5-3.217 The sole issue before
the Court was whether the state of Mississippi, when admitted to the Union,
took title to non-navigable tidewaters influenced by the ebb and flow of the
tide under the equal footing doctrine.218 The Court rejected the record
titleholders’ contention that Mississippi could not claim public trust
ownership of non-navigable tidewaters because the original thirteen states
did not uniformly make similar public trust claims of title.219 Justice White’s
majority opinion explained that the practices of other states were not
dispositive to the legitimacy of Mississippi’s claims because “it has long
been established that the individual States have the authority to define the
limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such
lands as they see fit.”220 The majority further observed that the American
jurisprudential expansion of the public trust to include lands beneath
navigable-in-fact nontidal waters did not signify an intent to depart from the
English common law ebb-and-flow test for tidal lands.221 Consequently, the
Phillips Petroleum Court reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s “long-standing
precedents” holding that the equal footing doctrine vested ownership with

213.
Cinque Bambini, 491 So.2d at 511; Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472.
214.
Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 473.
215.
Id. at 472-73.
216.
Id. at 472.
217.
Id. at 473. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision. Id. at 471. Justice
O’Connor dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia. Id. at 485. The dissenters
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the public trust extended to
nonnavigable tidal waters, arguing that the decision would upset settled expectations
of coastal property owners, and that “[n]avigability, not tidal influence, ought to be
acknowledged as the universal hallmark of the public trust.” Id. at 493, 486.
218.
Id. at 472.
219.
Id. at 475-76 (“Some of the original States, for example, did recognize
more private interests in tidelands than did others of the thirteen more private
interests than were recognized at common law, or in the dictates of our public trusts
cases. Because some of the cases which petitioners cite come from such States (i.e.,
from States which abandoned the common law with respect to tidelands), they are of
only limited value in understanding the public trust doctrine and its scope in those
States which have not relinquished their claims to all lands beneath tidal waters.”)
(citations omitted).
220.
Id. at 475.
221.
Id. at 478-79.
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the states of all waters subject to tidal ebb-and-flow,222 concluding that the
submerged lands at issue became public trust property of Mississippi on its
admission to the Union in 1817.223
Phillips Petroleum neither contradicts the holding nor the rationale of
Illinois Central. Yet one commentator argued Phillips Petroleum decision
undermined Illinois Central because of the Court’s mention that “it has been
long established that the individual states have the authority to define the
limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such
lands as they see fit.”224 But Justice White made this statement to explain
why the choice of some states to recognize private interests in tidelands did
not preclude those states (or other states) from claiming public trust
ownership to lands beneath non-navigable tidal waters.225 Moreover, the
Court explicitly affirmed the public trust doctrine by explaining that even in
states recognizing private ownership of tidelands, private rights are subject
to a public easement for trust purposes.226 Further, the absence of reliance
on Illinois Central by the Phillips Petroleum Court is unremarkable, considering
the facts of the Phillips case did not raise a challenge to alienation of
submerged lands, but instead centered on the issue of whether the equal
footing doctrine applied to non-navigable tidal waters. Consequently,
Phillips Petroleum is consistent with Illinois Central on the principle that states
may develop their public trust doctrines as they see fit, provided they do not
impermissibly abdicate control of sovereign trust lands.
Thus, neither Shively, Appleby, nor Phillips Petroleum contradict or
undermine the validity of the Illinois Central rule that a state may not abdicate
sovereign control of its trust lands unless such a conveyance promotes or
does not substantially impair trust purposes.227 Neither Shively nor Phillips
Petroleum confronted questions of state abdication of sovereign lands, and
Appleby’s upholding of a small conveyance falls within Illinois Central’s second
exception, as a conveyance too small to offend the public trust.228 The

222.
Id. at 476.
223.
Id. at 484.
224.
Id. at 475; See Pearson, supra note 6, at 738 (arguing this statement
undermines Illinois Central because it “indicated that states have the power to
determine the scope of the public trust doctrine within their respective borders”).
225.
Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 475.
226.
Id. at 483 n.12 (“It is worth noting, however, that even in some of these
States - i.e., even where tidelands are privately held - public rights to use the
tidelands for the purposes of fishing, hunting, bathing, etc., have long been
recognized.”).
227.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
228.
Interestingly, the text of Illinois Central includes an inherent rebuttal to the
argument that subsequent court decisions undermine the holding because they treat
the case briefly, if at all, or fail to mention the public trust doctrine as a restriction on
state power. Justice Field explained that “[g]eneral language sometimes found in
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notion that states may determine the scope of their public trust by defining
public trust uses or recognizing subordinate private rights in public trust
lands is entirely inconsistent with interpreting the public trust as a federal
floor that prohibits states from eliminating their trust responsibilities.229

VI. Illinois Central’s Legacy On State Court Jurisprudence
Interpreted as a whole, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence from Martin
to Phillips Petroleum outlines a consistent principle: Illinois Central announced
a general rule - a federal common law floor - concerning the responsibilities
and constraints the public trust doctrine places on all states with respect to
submerged lands. So long as states do not offend this general restraint on
alienation, they are free to fill out the content of their own public trust
doctrines by defining protected public trust uses and developing their own
analytical approaches to analysis of conveyances alleged to offend the
public trust.230 This section examines how state courts have interpreted
Illinois Central. This section first explains that state courts generally regard
Illinois Central’s restraint on alienation as a binding statement of federal law,
then discusses how state courts have relied on Illinois Central to give content
to the precise nature of the state’s trustee obligations.

opinions of the courts, expressive of absolute ownership and control by the State of
lands under navigable waters, irrespective of any trust as to their use and
disposition, must be read and construed with reference to the special facts of the particular
cases.” Id. When construed with reference to the special facts of each case, neither
Shively, Phillips, nor Appleby undermine or limit Illinois Central.
229.
See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 473, 483 n.12 (explaining that recognition
of private interests in tidelands does not necessarily equate with relinquishment of
state title or control to such lands).
230.
Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 551 (1986). Justice
Brennan explained “[s]tate experimentation cannot be excoriated simply because the
experiments provide more rather than less protection for civil liberties and individual
rights. While the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a state to fall below a
common national standard, above this level, our federalism permits diversity. As
tempting as it may be to harmonize results, . . . our federalism permits state courts
to provide greater protection to individual civil rights and liberties if they wish to do
so.” Id. In this sense, the relationship between the Illinois Central rule against
alienation is analogous to the Supreme Court’s approach to the federal Bill of Rights
incorporated against the states.
Under Supreme Court individual rights
jurisprudence, states are free to enforce more stringent protections of individual
liberties in their state constitutions and court systems, provided they do not fall
below the minimum floor of protections guaranteed under the Constitution. Id.
Similarly, with the public trust doctrine, states may expand, develop, or limit their
own public trust jurisprudence, provided they do not violate the minimum floor of
public trust protections required by the Illinois Central restraint on alienation.
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A. Truly a “Lodestar”? General Trends in State Court
Treatment of Illinois Central
Some state courts refer to Illinois Central as the “seminal case”231 or
adopt the language of Joseph Sax232 and herald the case as the “lodestar” of
American public trust jurisprudence.233 Although several commentators
have suggested that states recognize Illinois Central as persuasive but nonbinding,234 a close examination of state court decisions reveals that a
majority of courts appear to cite Illinois Central as mandatory authority. Some
thirty-five state courts have cited Illinois Central235 in the context of

231.
City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980); In re Water Use
Applications for the Waihole Ditch (Waihole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 440 (Haw. 2000); Kootenai
Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983).
232.
Sax, supra note 1, at 489 (calling the case a “lodestar in American public
trust law”).
233.
See Owsichek v. State Guide, Licensing, and Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 496
(Alaska 1988) (referencing the “lodestar of American public trust law, Illinois Central”)
and Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d. 1025, 1027 (Ill. App. 1984) (“The ‘lodestar’ of the
public trust doctrine in American law is Illinois Central[.]”). Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “lodestar” as having the primary meaning of “[a] guiding star; an inspiration
or model.” BRYAN A. GARNER, ED., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 960 (8th ed. 2004).
234.
See Dunning, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.02(b) (“[G]enerally the state
court decisions do not treat Illinois Central as binding upon them.”); Rasband, supra
note 13, at 71-73 (explaining the different approaches taken by state courts); see
Pearson, supra note 6, at 719 (“State courts have relied on Illinois Central to different
degrees when adopting the public trust doctrines.”)
235.
The thirty-five states to have cited Illinois Central in the context of
developing their public trust doctrine are as follows: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin. See CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988)
(“Illinois Central remains the leading case regarding public rights in tide and
submerged lands conveyed by the state. . . . [We] hold that any state tideland
conveyance which fails to satisfy the requirements of Illinois Central will be viewed as a
valid conveyance of title subject to continuing public easements for purposes of
navigation, commerce and fishery.”); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Public Interest v. Hassell, 837
P.2d 158, 168 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“From Illinois Central, we derive the proposition
that the state’s responsibility to administer its watercourse lands for the public
benefit is an inabrogable attribute of statehood itself. . . . . From Illinois Central we
also derive the core proposition that the state must administer its interests in lands
subject to the public trust consistent with public trust purposes.”); Arkansas v. S. Sand
& Material Co., 167 S.W. 854, 855, 856 (Ark. 1914) (recognizing that although a state
may grant the right to extract gravel, such a right “does not imply the right of the
state to relinquish its control over the river bed or to permit its use in a way which
would interfere with navigation” and citing Illinois Central for “explicit approval” of that
idea); City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 33 (Cal. 1980) (“Illinois Central . . . was
the seminal case on the scope of the public trust doctrine and remains the primary
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authority even today. . . . The decision established the principle that a state, as
administrator of the trust in tidelands on behalf of the public, does not have the
power to abdicate its role as trustee in favor of private parties.”); N.Y., New Haven &
Hartford R.R. Co. v. Armstrong, 102 A. 791, 794 (Conn. 1918) (citing Shively and Illinois
Central for the proposition that a state may grant submerged lands when the grant
does not offend the public interest); State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 644
(Fla. 1893) (explaining Illinois Central articulated “the settled law of this country” that a
state may only dispose of submerged lands when no substantial impairment of the
public interest results); King v. Oahu Ry. & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717, 1899 WL 1502, at *5
(1899) (citing Illinois Central for the principle that the state of Hawaii holds land under
navigable waters in trust for the people of Hawaii); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 671 P.2d
1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983) (citing Illinois Central as the “seminal case on the scope of the
public trust doctrine” and the authority for “the principle that a state, as
administrator of the trust in navigable waters, does not have the power to abdicate
its role as trustee in favor of private parties”); Att’y ’Gen. v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 146-49 (Ill.
1896) (citing and applying Illinois Central to uphold extension of Lake Front drive when
no substantial interference with public uses); Fenel v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d
808, 814 (Iowa 2000) (declining to extend public trust to public streets and alleys, but
recognizing Illinois Central as “prohibit[ing] a state from conveying important natural
resources to private parties”); Winters v. Myers, 140 P. 1033, 1037 (Kan. 1914) (citing
Illinois Central for the proposition that there is an important distinction between
grants that abdicate control over public uses in submerged lands and grants of lands
that do not have that effect); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So.2d 576, 589 (La.
1975) (phrasing the Illinois Central rule against abdication of sovereign control as a
general rule applicable to “the states”); Norton v. Town of Long Island, 883 A.2d 889, 897,
899 (Me. 2005) (holding United States had not impliedly condemned the state’s
public trust interests and recognizing general Illinois Central principle that states hold
land in trust and that private interests in tidelands ordinarily fall subordinate to the
state’s retained public trust rights); Opinion of the Justices, 424 N.E.2d. 1092, 1099-1100,
1108 (Mass. 1981) (citing Illinois Central for the principle that “the general view in this
country is that . . . a gross and egregious disregard of the public interest would not
survive constitutional challenge” but considering mainly state law to determine a
legislative act had authorized acquisition of private interests in, but not disposal of,
submerged land); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 51-61 (Mich. 2005) (upholding
pedestrian use of privately owned shoreline under public trust because the “state
lacks the power to diminish[public rights in trust lands] when conveying littoral
property to private parties, as recognized in Illinois Central); State v. Longyear Holding
Co.,29 N.W.2d 657, 669 (Minn. 1947) (citing Illinois Central for the proposition that “in
the exercise of such trust the state may dispose of partial interests in such lands, in
the interest of all the people of the state, provided the primary purposes of the trust
are not unduly abridged or burdened thereby”); Rice v. Stewart, 184 SO. 44, 50 (Miss.
1938) (relying on Illinois Central and state case law for the assertion that Mississippi
owns land beneath tidal navigable lands “with the consequent right to use or dispose
of any portion thereof, when that can be done without impairment of the interest of
the public in the waters”); Dep’t of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 956–57 (Mont.
1985) (citing Illinois Central for the proposition that a state may not abdicate trust in
public property); Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 52(N.J. 1972)
(citing Illinois Central as the “leading case” but grounding the New Jersey doctrine in
even earlier roots of Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1824)); Waterford Elec. Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. State, 203 N.Y.S. 858, 869 (N.Y.A.D. 1924) (using Illinois Central to articulate
the limitations on the “rights of the Legislature of the state to release its
governmental powers over navigable waters”); Gwathmey v. State Dept. of Envtl. Health,
152

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010

articulating their public trust doctrine.236 Of those, at least twenty-nine
appear to recognize Illinois Central as a general statement of federal law by
the United States Supreme Court that restrains their ability to convey public
trust lands - further supporting the notion that a federal core principle
underpins the Illinois Central rule restraining alienation of public trust
lands.237

and Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1995) (citing Illinois Central, but noting it did “not
involve North Carolina law”); Utd. Plainsmen Ass’n v. ND St. Water Conserv. Common, 247
N.W.2d 457, 460-62 (N.D. 1976) (holding the state engineer’s discretionary authority
to “allocate vital state resources” of water is circumscribed by the Illinois Central rule,
as codified in North Dakota statutes); Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 729-30
(Ohio1948) (quoting from the “landmark” case and describing it as a “scholarly and
persuasive” opinion before upholding city must condemn private lands before
constructs aid to navigation in those lands); Pac. Milling & Elev. Co. v. City of Portland,
133 P.72, 79, 82 (Or. 1913) (holding Oregon became owner of the Willamette river on
its admission to the Union after referencing Illinois Central for the limitation on the
ability of the state to alienate submerged lands); Reichard v. Flinn, 20 Pa. C.C. 129 (Pa.
Com. Pl. 1897) (referencing Illinois Central but holding the facts of the case do not
require the court to reach the inquiry of whether the legislature may grant a
municipal corporation power to dispose of public property to private hands);
Champlin’s Realty Assoc. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d. 1162 (R.I. 2003) (citing Illinois Central); State v.
Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 100 S.E. 355, 356 (S.C. 1919) (explaining public property
in rivers “ingrafted with a trust for the benefit of the public, and was inalienable
except for certain purposes”); Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d. 823, 829 (S.D. 2004) (noting
Illinois Central as “first articulation” of public trust doctrine but concluding trust does
not apply because beds of waters are non-navigable); Natland Co. v. Baker’s Point, Inc.,
865 S.W.2d 52, 59–60 (Tex. App. 1993) (discussing how the evolution of Texas public
trust jurisprudence has significantly limited application of the public trust); Colman v.
Utah State Ld. Bd. 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990) (explaining Illinois Central is the
“controlling case” on the nature of a state’s obligations relating to conveyances of
public trust lands to private interests); Vermont v. Ctl. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1129,
1133 (Vt. 1990) (applying Illinois Central to frame inquiry as to whether railway can sell
filled submerged lands to private developer, but noting states may develop different
approaches to the doctrine); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994-95 (Wash. 1987)
(referencing and applying Illinois Central inquiry to evaluate statute eliminating fees
for installation of private recreational docks); Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923)
(explaining the nature of the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin in light of Illinois
Central principles); City of Hampton v. Watson, 89 S.E. 81, 82 (Va. 1916) (recognizing
Illinois Central principle against alienation of submerged lands as controlling on
Virginia).
236.
The fifteen states that do not appear to have cited Illinois Central in the
context of discussing public trust are Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
237.
The six states where the status of Illinois Central has not been fully clarified
are Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Texas, and South Dakota.
Nebraska has cited Illinois Central only once, as one among a line of United States
Supreme Court cases supporting the principle that when waters are navigable, “the
bed thereunder would belong to the state, and be held by it in trust for the people.
The waters in such streams would be held to be publici juris, and not subject to
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Of the states considering the issue, only North Carolina raised some
doubt as to whether Illinois Central’s restraint on alienation was an expression
of federal law238 in a case involving competing claims of ownership between

riparian claims by the adjoining landowner.” Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 93 N.W. 781,
789 (Neb. 1903), overrul’d on other grounds by Wasserburger v. Coffee, 141 N.W.2d 738 (Neb.
1966). Similarly, because Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota’s scant treatment of
the doctrine in a single case that did not raise the exact issue of the ability of the
state to convey public trust lands, those states’ view of the doctrine cannot be
certainly described as binding. See Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 729-30
(Ohio 1948); Reichard v. Flinn, 20 Pa. C.C. 129 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1897); Parks v. Cooper,
676 N.W.2d. 823, 829 (S.D. 2004). The limits of the North Carolina and Texas
approaches are discussed infra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
238.
Professor Rasband argued that three states, North Carolina, South
Carolina and Texas, have refused to apply the Illinois Central restraint on alienation as
binding federal law, instead employing a rule of construction requiring a
presumption against state intent to convey public trust interests in trust lands.
Rasband, supra note 13, at 71-72 (citing to these three states in support of his
argument that “[a] few state courts have refused to follow Illinois Central and have
instead applied a presumption [against conveyances] akin to the approach taken in
the equal footing cases . . .”). Professor Rasband cited to three decisions in support
of his argument: Gwathmey v. State Dept. of Envtl. Health, and Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674
(N.C. 1995); Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern, 252 S.E.2d 133 (S.C. 1979); State v. Lain,
349 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. 1961).
However, Professor Rasband’s argument does not prove persuasive for two
reasons. First, a state court’s application of a presumption against conveyance of
public trust interests is entirely consistent with Illinois Central because the Illinois
Central Court expressly recognized that, prior to analyzing whether a legislature
conveyed public trust lands in violation of the public trust doctrine, a court’s
preliminary inquiry should be whether the legislature intended to effectuate a
conveyance. 146 U.S. 387, 450 (1892). Second, neither Texas nor South Carolina has
rejected Illinois Central as a statement of federal law.
The South Carolina case, Hobonny Club, 252 S.E.2d 133, does not even mention
Illinois Central, and on other occasions, South Carolina appellate courts have appeared
to read Illinois Central as binding precedent on South Carolina courts. E.g. State v.
Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 100 S.E. 355, 356 (S.C. 1919) (citing Illinois Central as one
case supporting the general rule that “[t]he property of the state in . . . rivers was
ingrafted with a trust for the benefit of the public, and was inalienable except for
certain purposes”); State v. Head, 498 S.E.2d 389, 392 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Illinois
Central for the proposition that [t]he state holds tidal navigable watercourses subject
to a public trust, and the state’s ownership of the public trust is generally not
alienable”).
Similarly, the Texas case cited by Professor Rasband, State v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d
579 (Tex. 1961) does not undermine the claim that Illinois Central is grounded in
federal law. After Galveston city ferry operators and managers began construction of
a ferry landing and dredging of a ferry channel across submerged lands owned by
private landowners, landowners sued the city and the state under a trespass theory
to enjoin the operation. Id. at 550. The trial court granted the state’s motion to be
dismissed from the case as a non-party, and issued an injunction against the city. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ issuance of an injunction
because only the state could assert public rights by challenging the validity of the
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private landowners and the state to marshlands beneath Middle Sound and
High Creek. The state appealed an adverse decision by the trial court to the
state supreme court,239 arguing that because the public trust doctrine
precluded the state from conveying title to private landowners free of public
trust rights, the trial court erred in holding certain privately owned
marshlands were not impressed by the public trust.240 The state relied on an
earlier North Carolina case, Shepard’s Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel,241 which
had cited Illinois Central for the rule that the legislature may not convey lands
subject to the public trust doctrine to private ownership when the transfer
would impair public interests.242 Distinguishing Shepard’s Point on its facts,
the court disavowed the case to the extent that it implied a complete
prohibition on the ability to convey submerged lands to private parties
without reserving public trust rights.243 In rejecting the state’s argument, the
court dropped a footnote mentioning that Illinois Central “did not involve
North Carolina law.”244 However, the supreme court ultimately ruled for the
state, upholding public trust right in the marshlands because the
landowners failed to rebut the presumption against conveyance of public
trust rights from the state.245

land owner’s title under the public trust, and the state had refused to participate in
the litigation. Id. at 558-59 (musing that “the State . . . could have challenged the
plaintiffs’ title and . . . .[h]ad it done so, operation of the ferry could not have been
enjoined”). Thus, Lain is better explained as a case where the public trust doctrine
could not be enforced because the state did not, in its capacity as trustee, assert
public rights. The court’s affirmation of the validity of the landowner’s (or rather, his
predecessor’s) grant from the Republic of Texas does not contradict Illinois Central rule
because the court expressly noted there was no indication that the private ownership
was interfering with public uses. Id. at 583, 584.
239.
The state appealed the state trial court’s holding that the majority of the
lands were not impressed by the public trust directly to the state supreme court.
Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d 674, at 677.
240.
Id. at 683 n.5 (N.C. 1995). In approximately 1987, the North Carolina
submerged lands program issued letters to private landowners confirming their
ownership of marshlands beneath Middle Sound and High Creek, subject to a
reservation of public trust rights by the state. Id. at 676. The state board of
education had conveyed the marshlands between 1926 and 1945, using language
characteristic of a fee simple grant. Id. The landowners sued the state, seeking
declarations on the quality of their titles in the lands. Id.
241.
Shepard’s Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 44 S.E. 39 (N.C. 1903).
242.
Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 682-83.
243.
Id. at 683.
244.
Id. at 683 n.5. In its entirety, the footnote read: “It is worth noting that
the Supreme Court in Illinois Central admitted that no authority supported its
proposition. More importantly, that case did not involve North Carolina law.” Id.
(citation omitted).
245.
Id. at 686. The court remanded the case to the trial court on other
grounds to clarify factual findings, and because the trial court potentially erred by
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The Gwathmey decision does not undermine the general theory of Illinois
Central as federal common law. The North Carolina court declined to apply
an earlier state court decision, not Illinois Central, and only rejected the state
case to the extent that it suggested an absolute rule against alienation: that
conveyance of public trust resources is never permissible.246 Limiting its
consideration of Illinois Central to a footnote, the court commented only that
Illinois Central “did not involve North Carolina law;” it did not state that the
decision was not binding on the states. Indeed, the ultimate result reached
in the case - the application of a presumption against conveyance of public
trust rights to preserve state control of trust rights - is entirely consistent
with Illinois Central.247 State courts’ treatment of the Illinois Central decision,
with the majority of states having considered the doctrine and cited it as
binding authority, corroborates the doctrine’s federal core.248 The next
section builds on these observations, using specific examples of state court
decisions adopting and applying the Illinois Central restraint on alienation.

B. How States Have Put the Illinois Central Public Trust
Doctrine To Work249
This section first examines how state courts have employed Illinois
Central as a foundational tool for filling in the details of the public trust
doctrine then explains how state courts have articulated their public trust
doctrines through a coordinated reading of Illinois Central and state
constitutional provisions by considering examples from state courts that
have used Illinois Central as the foundational principle for public trust
alienation analysis. This section illustrates how state courts are applying
Illinois Central and how the approach of state courts is consistent with a
federal common law explanation of Illinois Central. Thus, Illinois Central

making its navigable-in-fact determinations based on actual use of the waters, rather
on capacity of the waters to support navigation. Id. at 688.
246.
Id. at 683. Such an absolute rule is stricter than the one announced in
Illinois Central, so the North Carolina court’s rejection of an absolute restraint on
alienation under state law does not necessarily renounce the qualified restraint on
alienation required under Illinois Central.
247.
See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 450 (1892) (determining, as a preliminary
inquiry, whether the state intended to convey public trust rights).
248.
Although the state cases do not explicitly explain that the state
recognizes the Illinois Central rule as directly binding, this is unremarkable since
Supremacy Clause principles logically support that quotation of a Supreme Court
decision by a state court constitutes a tacit recognition of the decision as binding on
the court.
249.
The Coastal States Organization coined the phrase “Putting the Public
Trust Doctrine to Work” as the title of its treatise on coastal state approaches to the
public trust doctrine. See DAVID C. SLADE, ET AL, EDS. PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
TO WORK (2d ed. 1997); see also DAVID C. SLADE, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MOTION,
1997-2008 (2008).
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establishes not only a binding federal floor on state public trust doctrines,
but also supplies a useful starting point for state development of state
public trust law. Some states have put the public trust doctrine to work by
using Illinois Central as the foundational principle underlying their
development of a public trust doctrine.250 For example, Alaska explicitly
adopted the Illinois Central rule as its test for “determining whether a state
conveyance has passed title to a parcel of tideland free of any trust
obligations.”251 Affirming a lower court’s dismissal of a landowners trespass
claim against a state lessee who was net fishing in tidewaters,252 the Alaska
Supreme Court applied Illinois Central as a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the
conveyance furthered a public trust purpose, or (2) whether the conveyance
did not substantially impair the public interest in the tidelands.253
The landowner could not meet the first prong because language of the
state tideland patent, under which the landowner claimed title to the
tidelands, did not clearly express the state’s intent to abdicate its trust
responsibilities over the land.254 And the landowner failed to satisfy the
second prong because, although his tideland parcel was small, a ruling in
favor of the landowner could substantially impair the public trust by
implicating public trust rights in nearly all tidelands occupied before Alaska
obtained statehood in 1958.255 The Alaska Supreme Court thus applied the
Illinois Central inquiry, giving meaning to the term “substantial impairment”
as including consideration of both the size of the submerged land parcel at
issue and the broader statewide implications for the public trust that could
stem from the precedent set by eliminating public trust rights in the specific

250.
E.g., CWC Fisheries v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 1988); Caminiti v.
Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994-95 (Wash. 1987).
251.
CWC Fisheries, 755 P.2d at 1119.
252.
Id. at 1116-1117.
253.
Id. at 1119.
254.
Id. at 1119.
255.
Id. at 1120. Alaska also relied on the Illinois Central articulation of public
uses to reject a claim that mining is a public trust purpose under Alaska’s public
trust doctrine. Hayes v. A.J. Assoc., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska, 1993). After a lessee
of mineral rights on filled tidelands staked a claim to a mineral estate, the lessor
sought to eject the lessee. Id. at 131. The lessee argued he could not be ejected
because mining is a public trust activity. Id. at 133. Reversing the trial court’s
summary judgment in favor of the lessee, the Alaska Supreme Court held mining was
not a public trust use because the uses described in Illinois Central had the common
thread of “commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over
navigable waters” whereas mining involved an “exclusive, depleting use of a nonrenewable resource for private profit.” Id. at 133. The Hayes decision is an example of
the state relying on Illinois Central to fill in the content of the state’s public trust by
defining the trust uses recognized under state law.
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parcel at issue.256
A number of states have codified protections for common natural
resources within their constitutions.257 Some of these constitutional
provisions have the effect of expanding the scope of public trust rights
beyond traditionally recognized uses in submerged lands.258 State courts
256.
See CWC Fisheries, 755 P.2d at 1120. (“The statute at issue here made
available for private ownership virtually all Alaska tidelands occupied and developed
prior to statehood. To hold that persons receiving title under that statute hold the
fee free of any public trust obligations would, we believe, amount to a substantial
impairment of the public’s interest in state tidelands as a whole.”) (citations
omitted).
Similarly, in Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994-95 (Wash. 1987). the Washington
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute abolishing lease or
rental fees adopted a two-prong inquiry for testing a state’s alienation of public trust
lands. Id. The Caminiti court framed its inquiry as (1) whether the state has given up
its right of control over the jus publicum interests in trust lands, and if so, (2) whether
the state has promoted the interests or not substantially impaired the jus publicum.
Id. Applying the two-prong test, the state supreme court upheld challenge to the
validity of a state statute abolishing lease or rental fees previously charged by the
state to tideland and shoreland owners for the right to install and maintain private
recreational docks on submerged lands. Id. at 991. The court observed that the
legislature gave up relatively little control over the tidelands, as the statute only
applied to private recreational docks, and the state also retained the ability to
regulate the size and construction of the docks as well as the ability to repeal the
statute. Id. at 995, 996. Moreover, the statute did not substantially impair the jus
publicum because use of private docks promotes public use of waters. Id. at 996.
257.
See William Araiza, Democracy, Distrust and the Public Trust: Process-Based
Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine and the Search for a Substantive Environmental
Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 438, 438 n.244 (1997) (noting “[t]he constitutions of
approximately two-thirds of the fifty states include provisions that, in some way or
another, aim at the protection of natural resources” and listing provisions); see also id.
at 451 (“At least fifteen constitutions either claim some type of natural resource as
the public domain, for reasons other than pure reservation of exploitation rights, or
restrict or qualify the government’s power to alienate such resources.”) (citations
omitted).
258.
See Owsichek v. State Guide Licens’g and Control Bd.,763 P.2d 488 (Alaska
1988), where the state supreme court relied on the Common Use Clause of Alaska’s
Constitution (reading, in relevant part that “[w]herever occurring in their natural
state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use”) to
overturn a state statute granting certain geographic areas as exclusive hunting
domain of designated hunting guides as violating the state’s public trust. Id. at 49197 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3). See also Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control
Comm’n, 452 So.2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984) (remanding case after explaining how Art.
IX, § 3 of Louisiana’s Constitution protects “air and water as natural resources,
commands protection, conservation and replenishment of them insofar as possible
and consistent with health, safety and welfare of the people, and mandates the
legislature to enact laws to implement this policy”); Winters v. Myers, 140 P. 1033, 1038
(Kan. 1914) (relying on state constitutional equal protection clause and Illinois Central
to hold state cannot convey island in middle of navigable river under state grant of
school trust lands to private owner because the state holds submerged lands for the
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have applied these constitutional principles in conjunction with, or in lieu
of259 an Illinois Central analysis. For example, the Arizona Court of Appeals
struck down a state statute that substantially relinquished the state’s title to
beds of navigable watercourses as violating the public trust doctrine260 as
well as Arizona’s Constitution.261 State courts’ use of state constitutional
provisions to articulate or expand the public trust does not run contrary to
the theory of Illinois Central as grounded in federal law. Instead, these
interpretations are compatible with an understanding of Illinois Central as
establishing a federal common law “floor” limitation on state power, upon
which states are free to expand using state law.262

benefit of the public and “[a] statute which has the effect of thus transferring the
property of all the people, without compensation or public advantage, to a few,
denies the equal protection and benefit to the people for which government is
instituted”): See also cases cited infra note 271 (expanding public trust uses to water
rights after analysis of state constitutional provisions and Illinois Central public trust
principles)
259.
See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981) The state supreme court
issue an advisory opinion upholding the constitutionality under state law of state
statute releasing filled lands from public trust claims by the state, applying the state
public trust doctrine as requested by the referred questions from the legislature to
the court. Id. at 604. The court applied a five-prong test derived from the Legislative
Powers Clause of the Maine Constitution (art. IV, pt. 3, § 1) to evaluate whether the
legislative action conferred public benefit. Id. at 604, 607-09.
260.
Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Public Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
The act, H.B. 2017, effected an “uncompensated quitclaim of the state’s equal footing
interest in all watercourses other than the Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde Rivers and in
all lands formerly within those rivers but outside their current beds” and a $25 per acre
quitclaim fee for the rivers excluded from the uncompensated quitclaim. Id. at 162.
261.
The Arizona court rooted its state law grounds for the decision in the
state’s “constitutional commitment to the checks and balances of a government of
divided powers” and in the Gift Clause, the text of which prohibits the State from
making “any donation or grant . . . to any individual, association, or corporation”) Id.
at 168; ARIZ. CONST. art IX, § 7. The court construed the Gift Clause as the state
“constitutional framework for judicial review of an attempted legislative transfer of a
portion of the public trust.” Id. at 170.
262.
This approach is analogous to that taken by the Supreme Court between
the federal Constitution and state governments in protecting individual rights and
civil liberties that have been incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment against
the states. See Brennan, supra note 229, at 550 (“the Fourteenth Amendment fully
applied the provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states, thereby creating a
federal floor of protection and that the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
allow diversity only above and beyond this federal constitutional floor. . . . While state
experimentation may flourish in the space above this floor, we have made a national
commitment to this minimum level of protection through enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”); see, e.g., Hassell, 837 P.2d at 167 (characterizing Illinois
Central as explaining a “common law” doctrine that “restricts the sovereign’s ability to
dispose of resources held in public trust” but that “[w]hether an attempted
disposition of public trust property meets such criteria [laid out in Illinois Central] is
not determined pursuant to federal common law. Rather, as an attribute of
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California’s use of its state law - in conjunction with the general
principles of Illinois Central - to extend the public trust doctrine to water
rights provides a good example of a state using Illinois Central as a federal
floor for its public trust jurisprudence. Although by its terms Illinois Central
applied a trust responsibility only to lands submerged beneath navigable
waters,263 the California Supreme Court, in its Mono Lake decision, used the
underlying principles of Illinois Central doctrine to expand the scope of the
public trust to apply to water rights.264 After state-authorized water
diversions from non-navigable feeder streams depleted the level of
navigable Mono Lake,265 doubling the salinity level and exposing local bird
species to predators, environmentalists filed suit in 1979 to enjoin the
diversions, arguing a violation of the state’s public trust duties.266
Vacating the trial court’s judgment, the California Supreme Court ruled
for the environmentalists.267 The state supreme court cited Illinois Central and
state cases applying Illinois Central principles to flesh out the state’s trust
duties in submerged lands, concluding the “cases amply demonstrate the
continuing power of the state as administrator of the public trust, a power
which extends to the revocation of previously granted rights or to the
enforcement of the trust against lands long thought free of the trust.”268 The
court ruled that the public trust impressed the state with a “duty” to “protect
the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands,
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.”269
Seeking an accommodation of the demands of the state water rights

federalism, each state must develop its own jurisprudence for the admission of the
lands it holds in public trust.”).
263.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)
264.
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). In
2000, the Hawaii Supreme Court followed California’s lead of relying on the Illinois
Central public trust doctrine and a state constitutional provision to protect water as a
public trust resource. In re Waihole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 439-445 (Haw. 2000).
265.
“Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California, sits at the base of the
Sierra Nevada escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park. The
lake is saline; it contains no fish but . . . . [i]slands in the lake protect a large
breeding colony of California gulls, and the lake itself serves as a haven on the
migration route for thousands of Northern Phalarope, Wilson’s Phalarope, and Eared
Grebe.” Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 711.
266.
Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 713-18 (describing factual and procedural
history of the case); see Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving
Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 705-06 (1995) (describing the history
behind the Mono Lake decision).
267.
Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 732-33.
268.
Id. at 723.
269.
Id. at 724.
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system270 and the public trust doctrine,271 the California Supreme Court held
the public trust principle that “[t]he state as sovereign retains continuing
supervisory control over its navigable waters and the lands beneath those
waters” applies to water rights as well as submerged lands.272 In its capacity
as trustee, California thus had a duty to exercise continuous supervision to
ensure consideration of trust values in water rights allocations, including
revocation of revoke water rights when necessary prevent harm to trust
uses.273
Renowned for its impact on both California water allocation and public
trust law,274 the Mono Lake decision also stands for several important
principles about the relationship between the Illinois Central restraint on
alienation and state development of public trust law. It illustrates how
Illinois Central’s restraint on alienation outlines only one component of a
state’s public trust duties, which extend more broadly to encompass the
duty to administer an ongoing trust.275 Moreover, Mono Lake provides an
example of how a court can harmonize a state’s trustee duty with existing
state law frameworks, because the California court required the state to
accommodate the state water law system in its duty to preserve public trust
resources. Finally, Mono Lake demonstrates how a state may go beyond the
federal floor (restraint on alienation of submerged trust lands) to expand the
public trust doctrine to other resources, such as water, when such an
expansion is compatible with state law. The Mono Lake decision is but one
example of how state courts have harmonized the Illinois Central federal
common law restraint on alienation with state law to develop a body of
270.
The court considered not only California’s water code, but also Article X,
section 2 of the California Constitution, which reads in part: “It is hereby declared
that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires
that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of
which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to
be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest
of the people for the public welfare.”
271.
Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727 (explaining the court was “seeking an
accommodation” between the two systems because “[t]o embrace one system of
thought and reject the other would lead to an unbalanced structure, one which
would either decry as a breach of trust appropriations essential to the economic
development of this state, or deny any duty to protect or even consider the values
promoted by the public trust”).
272.
Id.
273.
Id. at 727-29; see also Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 265, at 707-08
(emphasizing the significance of decision’s development of the balance between
water law and public trust principles in California).
274.
See generally Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 265 (discussing the landmark
nature of the Mono Lake case as an expression of the public trust doctrine, its legacy
in California law, and its progeny in other western states).
275.
Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 723.
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public trust jurisprudence.276

VII. Conclusion
The Illinois Central public trust doctrine is best understood as the result
of federal common law reasoning, based on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the equal footing doctrine and the phrase “this Union” in
Article 4, section 3 of the Constitution.277 The public trust doctrine,
restraining the states from abdicating control over the lands they hold in
trust for the public as part of their duty as trustee, devolved from English
common law to the states.
Grounding the doctrine in federal common law is consistent with both
the text and rationale of the Illinois Central opinion.
Neither the
jurisprudential shift away from general federal common law since Erie nor
subsequent Supreme Court decisions on the nature of a state’s right in
submerged lands erode the applicability of Illinois Central as binding
precedent on the states.278 Interpreting the Illinois Central public trust
doctrine as a federal common law “floor” on state public trust
responsibilities279 provides enduring protection against private monopolies
of public resources while allowing each state to flexibly apply and expand its
own public trust jurisprudence.

276.
277.
278.
279.
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See supra notes 249-60 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.

